The Prospects for Offshore Financial Centres in Europe. CEPS Reports in Finance and Banking No. 29, 1 August 2002 by Levin, Mattias.
 
 
 
THE PROSPECTS FOR 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES IN EUROPE 
MATTIAS LEVIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEPS RESEARCH REPORT 
AUGUST 2002  
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research 
institute in Brussels. Its mission is to produce s ound policy research leading to 
constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe. As a research institute, CEPS 
takes no position on matters of policy. The views expressed are entirely those of the 
author. Mattias Levin is a Research Fellow at CEPS and a specialist in the area of 
banking and financial markets in the European Union.  
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable input he received in the context of two 
other projects: a high-level workshop in Liechtenstein on offshore financial centres in 
November 2001 and a study mission to Madeira with his colleague Wolfgang Hager, 
also in November 2001. He would also like to thank Prince Nikolaus of Liechtenstein, 
Stefano Catelani of Du Pont and Karel Lannoo, CEPS CEO, for their constructive 
comments  on earlier drafts of this report. All opinions and any remaining errors, 
however, are the author’s alone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 92-9079-382-1 
© Copyright 2002, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means  – electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, recording or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies. 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32(0)2 229.39.11 Fax: 32(0)2 219.41.51 
E-mail: info@ceps.be 
Website: http://www.ceps.be  
 
CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................I 
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................1 
1.  THE RISE OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES ............................................................2 
1.1  OFCs defined.....................................................................................................2 
1.2  From humble beginnings to a flourishing industry............................................3 
1.3  Benefits to users and hosts.................................................................................3 
1.4  A deteriorating business climate........................................................................5 
1.5  Unilateral attempts to handle low-tax jurisdictions ...........................................6 
2.  OFCS UNDER SIEGE..................................................................................................12 
2.1  Economic integration and collective action.....................................................12 
2.2  The FSF – Threat to financial stability............................................................17 
2.3  The OECD – Harmful tax competition............................................................19 
2.4  The FATF – Money laundering.......................................................................22 
2.5  The EU – Obstacles to the integrity of the single market................................25 
3.  A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS...............................................................................29 
3.1  Andorra............................................................................................................31 
3.2  Gibraltar...........................................................................................................33 
3.3  Guernsey..........................................................................................................35 
3.4  Isle of Man.......................................................................................................38 
3.5  Jersey...............................................................................................................40 
3.6  Liechtenstein....................................................................................................42 
3.7  Madeira............................................................................................................45 
3.8  Monaco ............................................................................................................48 
3.9  "Legitimate" OFCs .........................................................................................50 
4.  THE PROSPECTS FOR OFCS.......................................................................................55 
4.1  A deteriorating outlook....................................................................................55 
4.2  Policy recommendations..................................................................................56 
REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................60 
USEFUL ADDRESSES .........................................................................................................65 
  
List of Tables 
1.   Offshore financial centres in perspective ....................................................................3 
2.   The benefits from using OFCs.....................................................................................4 
3.   Policy coordination in the field of tax and finance....................................................14 
4.   Summary of policy initiatives....................................................................................16 
5.   FATF’s blacklist (February 2002).............................................................................24 
6.   The FATF’s special recommendations on terrorist financing...................................25 
7.   The Feira European Council Agreement on the taxation of savings .........................26 
8.   A survey of selected OFCs........................................................................................30 
9.   Andorra's financial centre..........................................................................................32 
10. Gibraltar’s financial centre ........................................................................................34 
11. Gibraltar’s tax regime................................................................................................34 
12. Guernsey’s financial centre .......................................................................................36 
13. Guernsey’s tax regime...............................................................................................37 
14. Isle of Man’s financial centre ....................................................................................38 
15. Isle of Man’s tax regime............................................................................................39 
16. Jersey’s financial centre.............................................................................................40 
17. Jersey’s tax regime ....................................................................................................41 
18. Liechtenstein’s financial centre.................................................................................42 
19. Liechtenstein’s tax regime.........................................................................................43 
20. Madeira’s financial centre .........................................................................................47 
21. Madeira’s tax regime.................................................................................................47 
22. Monaco’s financial centre..........................................................................................48 
23. Monaco’s tax regime .................................................................................................49 
24. Strategies for adapting to a harsh environment .........................................................56 
List of Figures 
1. Total tax revenues as percentage of GDP....................................................................19 
2. Different taxes as share of GDP in the EU..................................................................20 
3. Different specialisations of OFCs’ ..............................................................................31 
List of Boxes 
1.   The collapse of Enron – Hiding profits and losses offshore........................................9 
2.   The use of tax havens: The Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) regime in the US ....10 
3.   Possible counter-measures by the OECD..................................................................21 
4.   FATF counter-measures against non-cooperative jurisdictions and territories.........24 
5.   State aid rules in the EU............................................................................................27 
6.   Fiscal incentives in the Canary Islands......................................................................46 
  
i 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ince 1998, a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to offshore 
financial centres (OFCs). Little is known, however, about OFCs and the business 
environment in which they operate. The aim of this paper is therefore to increase 
the awareness of OFCs. It provides a critical assessment of the various initiatives 
targeting OFCs and a first in-depth overview and comparison of European OFCs. 
The international actions targeting OFCs are partly motivated out of genuine concerns. 
Onshore countries fear that OFCs may erode their tax bases. They also claim that OFCs 
may offer a safe harbour for money launderers. Finally, it is claimed that OFCs 
endanger international financial stability. As a result, OFCs have faced “attacks” from 
the OECD on tax matters, from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money 
laundering and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). In addition, European OFCs are 
being pressured by the European Union (EU) to engage in automatic exchange of 
information in the context of current negotiations on the directive concerning the 
taxation of savings income.  
At the same time, however, international actions aimed at curbing OFCs also have to be 
read through the prism of the cut-throat competition between financial centres for the 
location of lucrative financial services. Over the last 20 years, OFCs have managed to 
carve out a sizeable market share in private wealth management. While the world’s 
roughly 70 OFCs only make up 1.2% of the world's population and 3.1% of the world’s 
GDP, they are managing one-quarter of the world’s assets. At the end of 1997, OFCs’ 
share of cross-border assets stood at 54.2%, growing at an annual rate of over 6%.
1 The 
sum of bank deposits and funds under management in the European OFCs surveyed in 
this paper alone exceeds €800 billion. In that context, the main beneficiaries of curbing 
them will be the leading onshore financial centres, primarily the City of London and 
New York. It is therefore not surprising that the UK and the US have championed these 
policy actions and one can reasonably question the sincerity of their support. 
The strength of the international action varies from issue to issue and depends on the 
validity of the underlying argument. On money laundering and financial stability, the 
recommendations have been more or less swiftly implemented by the OFCs, as the 
norms and principles underpinning these areas were relatively widely shared. On tax 
matters, things have progressed much more slowly. One of the reasons is that the 
underlying economic case is weaker. There is no empirical evidence supporting the 
claim that OFCs contribute to a “race to the bottom” in tax revenues, as these remain 
stable. There is also little conclusive evidence regarding a shift in the burden of taxation 
from mobile tax bases (capital) to immobile ones (labour). The OECD’s and the EU’s 
attempts to curb OFCs therefore rely on relatively unstable foundations. Moreover, the 
process has been marred by disagreements among OECD members and changes in the 
assessment criteria. 
                                                 
1 Walter (1998) and IMF (1999). 
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The events of 11 September have provided a new momentum to the international 
actions targeting OFCs. Any remaining doubts about the merits of the FATF’s 
recommendations quickly evaporated, as OFCs and onshore jurisdictions raced against 
one another to avoid having their reputations tarnished from any association with the act 
of harbouring money connected with terrorist activities. This same concern over their 
reputation has convinced a majority of the blacklisted OFCs to start cooperating with 
the OECD.  
The outlook for OFCs therefore looks rather bleak, as the FATF has decreased OFCs’ 
regulatory advantage, and the OECD has taken one step further towards curbing OFCs’ 
tax advantages. This is particularly true for European OFCs, which in addition to global 
demands, are faced with requests from the EU for action in two areas: 
1.  Taxation. The EU agreement on the taxation of savings income is dependent upon 
European OFCs imposing equivalent or similar measures to the ones envisaged by 
EU members. While little is known about the current status of negotiations between 
the EU and the OFCs, the advance of the OECD process will not harm the EU’s 
position.  
2.  Financial regulation. The constitutional links between the EU and European OFCs 
vary widely. All of them are, however, not entirely free to develop their own 
regulatory framework as they see fit. In some cases, the impact is direct. Madeira, 
for example, is an integral part of Portugal and thus operates under EU single 
market rules. Similarly, the UK’s dependent territories, the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man, often have to maintain financial regulations that match the standards in 
the UK, and the UK has to follow EU laws. Liechtenstein, being a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), is also obliged to enact a vast array of Single 
Market legislation without having a say on its content. In short, the EU’s Single 
Market programme in one way or another affects the margin of freedom enjoyed by 
European OFCs.  
Therefore, OFCs in general and EU OFCs in particular will find it increasingly difficult 
to defend their regulatory and tax advantages. In particular: 
1.  FATF and the FSF. OFCs should increase the amount of resources devoted to 
financial supervision and enforcement; know-your-customer rules should be strictly 
enforced, money laundering legislation should be kept up-to-date with FATF 
standards; and OFCs should rapidly implement the FATF’s recent measures on 
terrorism financing. 
2.  OECD. OFCs should cooperate with the OECD, provided that a true level playing 
field is established. That would require OECD members (e.g. Switzerland and 
Luxembourg) to accelerate the dismantling of their harmful tax measures.  
3.  EU savings tax. The EU is already finding it difficult to convince European OFCs to 
implement similar measures to those adopted by member states. Advances in the 
OECD process is likely to be of limited importance to the EU process, as the EU 
demands automatic information exchange, and not just the supply of information in 
response to a specific request from a foreign tax administration. The reaction of 
European OFCs is entirely comprehensible. The only reason why the EU is engaged 
in negotiations is that it was the only way to persuade Luxembourg (and to some 
extent Austria) to agree on information exchange. A sensible compromise solution EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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would be that OFCs permanently introduce the same system that Luxembourg and 
Austria will have on an interim basis, i.e. withholding taxes of 15-20% coupled with 
transferring 75% of the revenue to the member state of residence of the investor. 
That is an offer that the EU would find hard to refuse. 
In the medium to long term, OFCs should try to expand into other fields of business that 
depend less on low taxes and lenient regulation, but it should be recognised that this is a 
process that takes time and requires assistance. By virtue of their small size and 
flexibility, OFCs are nevertheless well placed to reap the opportunities that such a 
changeover implies.   
1 
INTRODUCTION 
ffshore financial centres (OFCs) have received much attention over the last few 
years. The reasons are manifold. Not only are OFCs regarded as eroding the tax 
base of onshore countries and providing a convenient means to clean proceeds 
from crime, they are also thought to pose a threat to the world financial system due to 
their alleged unregulated and unsupervised financial activities and services. 
Prior to the events of September 11, the international initiatives that tried to curb the 
actions of OFCs seemed to have lost much of their momentum. The attacks, however, 
have re-ignited international action on tax havens and offshore financial centres 
launched by various different international organisations including the EU, the OECD, 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). 
Nevertheless, the problems encountered in the course of these efforts to curb offshore 
activities illustrate the underlying difficulty of creating and sustaining international 
coordination in the sphere of international finance and tax. 
The reasons why offshore centres are the focus of policy attention are manifold. OFCs 
have expanded rapidly during the last decades, both in number and in volume of 
business. OFCs have managed to attract a large share of the world’s financial activity. 
While the worlds roughly 70 OFCs only make up 1.2% of the world's population and 
3.1% of the world’s GDP, OFCs are managing one-quarter of the world’s assets. At the 
end of 1997, their share of cross-border assets stood at 54.2%, growing at an annual rate 
of over 6%.
2 Low taxes, light regulation, flexible company rules and high levels of 
secrecy are part of the explanation behind their success. Another explanation lies in the 
new opportunities offered by information technology. Thanks to information 
technology, OFCs may capture far vaster chunks of lucrative financial services.  
As OFCs have expanded, onshore countries have started to cooperate in order to curb 
them. The first purpose of this paper is to explain how this cooperation has come about 
and to assess whether it will endure. A second purpose is to raise the awareness and 
understanding of offshore centres. No comparative outlook on European OFCs exists to 
date. The paper will concentrate on a number of questions: what are the characteristics 
of an OFC; why are they successful; why and how are they criticised; do the states that 
are criticising offshore centres have a legitimate case; what should OFCs do? 
The paper starts by tracing the evolution of OFCs and depicting their main 
characteristics  and current size. Chapter 2 presents the foundations of international 
policy cooperation and the major concerns raised by the activity of OFCs, namely the 
threat to financial stability, money laundering and harmful tax competition. Chapter 3 
surveys a cross-section of European OFCs. And finally, Chapter 4 offers a tentative 
policy outlook, attempting to judge the prospects for OFCs in this increasingly hostile 
international environment.  
                                                 
2 Walter (1998) and IMF (1999). 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RISE OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES 
ffshore financial centres are not homogeneous entities. While attracting the same 
kind of business, i.e. wealth management or other tailor-made services for the 
rich but not so famous, they nevertheless differ according to their regulation, 
taxation and use of secrecy. This section presents the main characteristics of the 
offshore business: definition, size, specialisation and the various benefits they offer to 
investors, as well as the overall trends affecting the offshore segment of financial 
markets.  
1.1  OFCs defined 
Financial centres differ widely one from another and there are many ways of 
distinguishing between them. One can distinguish, for example, between  functional 
centres, where the financial sector is serving a dynamic real economy, and booking 
centres, which mainly serve as intermediaries for transactions where the underlying 
value is created elsewhere.
3 Another way could be to define what counts as offshore 
business in any OFC and then to calculate the share of GDP accounted for by these 
services. Yet another way of distinguishing among OFCs has been developed by the 
IMF
4 in which financial centres are divided into three categories: 
•  International financial centres (IFCs) are characterised by deep and liquid markets 
with diverse sources and uses of funds, with advanced payments and settlements 
systems, which provide a full range of financial services to large domestic 
economies and beyond (e.g. London, New York and Tokyo).  
•  Regional financial centres (RFCs) feature developed financial markets and 
infrastructure, channel funds in and out of their regions, but are associated with 
relatively small domestic economies (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore and Luxembourg). 
•  Offshore financial centres (OFCs) are much smaller and provide more limited 
specialist services.  
This division may not be as clear-cut as it first seems. Some of the larger OFCs 
resemble the RFCs in certain respects, implying that it is difficult to define OFCs with a 
great degree of precision. However, OFCs normally combine some of the following 
characteristics: a high number of financial institutions that mainly serve non-residents, 
financial systems out of proportion with the domestic economy’s needs, low or no taxes, 
light financial supervision and regulation, flexible use of different company structures, 
and high levels of bank secrecy and anonymity. 
In short, when speaking about OFCs, this paper refers to countries or territories where 
the financial sector is large as compared to the domestic economy, moderately 
regulated, taxed at a low level and providing services mainly to non-residents. 
                                                 
3 Walter (1998).  
4 IMF (2000b). 
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1.2  From humble beginnings to a flourishing industry 
The offshore industry started to grow in the 1960s. The introduction of burdensome 
regulation and distortionary economic policies in industrialised countries in the 1960s – 
such as capital controls, interest-rate ceilings, reserve requirements, restrictions on the 
kind of activities that supervised institutions were allowed to undertake and high levels 
of taxation – led to a boost in offshore business. The most prominent early starters in 
Europe were Luxembourg and the Channel Islands. Today, the IMF estimates the 
number of OFCs at around 70.
5  
As can be seen from Table 1, the offshore finance industry is large. As a simple 
indication of its relative importance, the value of assets managed by OFCs was more 
than ten times the value of global foreign direct investment in 1998; nearly two times 
the value of world trade and roughly one-third the turnover value on the world’s leading 
stock exchanges.  
Nevertheless, measuring the size of OFCs is difficult, as they do not disclose much data. 
Only the largest OFCs (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore) report bank data to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). None of the European OFCs does, even though 
Liechtenstein by virtue of its currency  union is included in Switzerland’s filings with 
the BIS. In addition, the data do not cover over-the-counter (OTC) activity, or other 
financial institutions than banks. Therefore, OFC data should be regarded with a healthy 
dose of scepticism.  
Table 1. Offshore financial centres in perspective 
Activity  Size ($ bn) 
Global assets under management in OFCs, 1998  7,500 
World trade 1998 (exports)  4,200 
FDI 1998 (inflows)  644 
Source: Eurostat trade database, UNCTAD (1999) and Walter (1998). 
1.3  Benefits to users and hosts 
On the demand side, the main users of OFCs can be found among wealthy, high net-
worth individuals, international companies, international investors and criminals. Their 
aim is generally to maximise the return on their assets by minimising the costs 
emanating from taxes, control and regulation. Table 2 provides a general overview of 
the main users and the benefits they derive from investing in an OFC.  
Turning to supply, countries might choose to establish an OFC for a number of reasons. 
The primary reason is income. Even though fees and taxes are by definition low, they 
represent the major source of government revenue in the most OFCs. In addition, a 
country might want to gain access to international capital markets. For developing 
countries an OFC may be a convenient way to tap world markets. Second, they may 
want to attract foreign technical expertise. The benefits from an OFC are analogous to 
those deriving from foreign direct investment; the arrival of large multinational banks 
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also means the arrival of know-how. Moreover, they may want to harness competition. 
An OFC may provide a convenient way to increase competition in the financial sector 
while at the same time providing shelter to domestic financial institutions. Finally, a 
country may want to reap indirect gains: apart from know-how, other positive effects 
may be an increase in the level of employment and an increase in wages. 
Table 2. The benefits from using OFCs 
Actor  Benefits 
International companies  •  Maximise profits 
•  Issue securitised products through special 
purpose vehicles 
•  Protect assets from claimants 
Investors (individuals, funds, trusts …)  •  Minimise taxes 
•  Protect assets from claimants  
•  Avoid disclosing investment positions 
Financial institutions with affiliates in 
OFCs 
•  Minimise taxes 
•  Avoid regulatory requirements in onshore 
jurisdictions 
Insurance companies  •  Accumulate reserves in low-tax jurisdictions 
•  Conduct business in benign regulatory 
environment 
Criminals  •  Launder proceeds from crime 
•  Use local secrecy as protection against inquiries 
•  Commit financial fraud 
Source: Adapted from Financial Stability Forum (2000a).  
As a consequence, the establishment of an OFC has sometimes been regarded as a 
proper development strategy for small states. The establishment of an OFC may indeed 
lead to a rapid sophistication of the financial industry and increased growth. Supported 
and protected by the legal framework of the state system, countries have been able to 
design regimes targeted at attracting wealth generated elsewhere. The effects may be 
direct, in terms of the tax or fee revenues from the institutions that locate in the OFC or 
the employment opportunities and income taxes paid by their employees. They may also 
be indirect in terms of the supporting sectors that are built up to serve the OFCs 
(associated professions, catering, hotels, etc.). This does not happen by itself however. 
The OFC business, by targeting non-residents only, may if not properly organised 
develop into a cocoon within the economy, crowding out alternative economic activity.
6 
This might make a country too dependent upon one particular activity. Therefore, 
reaping the gains from an OFC requires active government intervention.  
In addition, it would be naïve to think that the establishment of an OFC is always driven 
by such altruistic developmental considerations. For many cash-strapped governments, 
an OFC offers quick access to money (the fewer questions the government is willing to 
ask, the more lucrative the OFC promises to be). It is therefore more appropriate to say 
                                                 
6 Hampton and Abbott (1999). THE RISE OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES 
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that there is a development dimension to OFCs. A financial centre can offer significant 
benefits to poor countries (or their governments) and may under certain conditions offer 
a short cut to a more rapid economic development.  
1.4  A deteriorating business climate 
At first glance, the outlook for OFCs from a purely business point of view looks bright. 
The assets of wealthy investors in the world are estimated to be worth more than $30 
trillion by 2004. The growth in investable assets is particularly fast for people under 35 
and for particular countries, such as the United States, Britain and France.  
While offshore growth has long outpaced onshore growth in terms of assets, recent 
trends portray a shift in fortunes. According to a recent survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, one can start to see a move back onshore, as offshore markets 
have started to fall behind onshore markets both in terms of asset and revenue growth.
7 
This is a reflection of the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to hide wealth 
offshore. It is also caused by a more hands-on investment approach by investors. 
Information technology in general and the Internet in particular have increased the 
amount of financial information available to individual investors. This development, in 
turn, has encouraged investors to become more active in their portfolio management and 
less reliant on their private bankers. For example, it is estimated that among wealthy 
Europeans, more than 50% are using online brokers and 20% use Internet banking. This 
is expected to increase as information technology develops further (e.g. UMTS).
8 As a 
result, customers are becoming more demanding. They require higher returns that are 
typically only associated with equity. And because investments in equity tend to earn 
higher returns if the analysts are closer to major financial centres, it is more difficult for 
OFCs to compete in this area. The traditional comparative advantage of OFCs  – 
discretion, no taxes – is of lesser importance in this domain. 
A further contributing factor is that onshore regulation has become more market-driven 
and less burdensome. The tax pressure has decreased in many countries and markets 
have become deeper and more liquid. This is especially the case in the EU, following 
the introduction of the euro. As a consequence, investors have less reason to seek refuge 
in OFCs. 
Furthermore, brand value is among the attributes highlighted as one of the most 
important determinants in the competition for customers. Offshore centres, 
characterised by anonymity, small size, small markets and limited services, and in light 
of ongoing international initiatives that threaten to tarnish their reputations, are finding 
it more difficult to grow in this environment. 
So far, OFCs have responded by broadening the services they offer. The Channel 
Islands, for example, have created a stock exchange in order to provide deeper and more 
liquid securities markets. Many OFCs are currently investing heavily in 
telecommunications and are developing laws that will attract e-commerce providers.  
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1.5  Unilateral attempts to handle low-tax jurisdictions
9 
As OFCs have increased in importance, countries have tried to limits their companies’ 
and individuals’ ability to use OFCs and thus escape domestic taxation. These unilateral 
attempts to limit the use of OFCs have taken many forms: 
•  General anti-avoidance measures. Most countries have either explicit rules or 
unwritten principles that allow authorities to question operations that at the outset 
appear legal but whose purpose are to avoid taxes. The efficacy of these rules are 
often called into question, especially in light of the fact that it is often difficult for 
tax administrators to prove fraud or the fictitious nature of a particular international 
operation.  
•  Measures against “thin capitalisation”. Companies can normally deduct interest 
expenses from their taxable income, thus diminishing the taxable base. It is 
therefore interesting for companies to maximise their holdings of debt instruments 
as opposed to equity capital. In order to stem abuses of the deductibility of interest, 
most countries have rules on thin capitalisation, stating that the ratio of debt to 
equity should not exceed a certain percentage. Most countries have such provisions 
for subsidiaries located in OFCs as well.  
•  Audit transfer prices. According to OECD principles, transfer prices between 
associated companies are supposed to take place at “arm’s length”, i.e. as if the 
transaction took place between two independent companies at market prices. This 
leaves plenty of scope for transfer-pricing manipulation by companies, which have 
an interest in placing as much value as possible in an OFC where no corporate taxes 
are levied. Some countries have particular rules preventing such abuse.  
•  CFC rules. Since most countries tax residents on their world-wide income but treat 
non-resident companies separately for tax purposes, residents can avoid or defer 
taxation if they place income in a foreign corporation. Such behaviour is particularly 
lucrative if the foreign corporation is placed in an OFC. Rules on Controlled 
Foreign Corporations (CFCs) serve the purpose of limiting such avoidance or 
deferral. As a result, countries applying CFC legislation tend to regard deferral as 
unacceptable if a) residents control or have a substantial interest i n a foreign 
corporation, b) the income placed in the foreign corporation is primarily “passive” – 
e.g. income from royalties, dividends, rents and interest – and not genuine business 
income, and c) the income is taxed at a zero or low foreign rate. First imposed by 
the US in 1962, CFC rules are imposed today by nearly all OECD members.  
•  Taxation conventions. Tax conventions serve the laudable purpose of eliminating 
double taxation. They can be abused, however, by residents incorporating in OFCs 
and then claiming exemption from high onshore taxation by virtue of a double tax 
convention. In order to limit such opportunities, most onshore companies have not 
concluded conventions with OFCs (see Table 8b in Chapter 3). Exceptions are 
countries with historical ties (e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) or 
geographical proximity (e.g. Liechtenstein’s links with Austria and Switzerland or 
Monaco’s links with France). As elaborated below, those countries have 
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nevertheless tried to limit the application of these conventions (e.g. excluding its 
application to tax exempt companies).  
Apart from these measures that are generally are followed by most countries, some 
countries have been particularly active in dealing with OFCs.  
United Kingdom 
During the 1990s, the U K reviewed financial regulation in its Crown dependencies 
(Channel Islands and Isle of Man) and Overseas Territories (13 jurisdictions, formerly 
known as dependent territories mainly located in the Caribbean, but also including 
Gibraltar). Following increasing awareness that the UK was losing a sizeable chunk of 
tax revenue, over £1 billion a year according to estimations by the Inland Revenue, the 
UK began to exert pressure on these jurisdictions to change their tax regimes. 
In the wake of criticism from international investors following a 1993 bank failure in 
Jersey and allegations of secrecy, poor supervision and poor cooperation, the UK 
decided in 1997 to launch an investigation of financial regulation in the Crown 
Dependencies, known as the Edwards Review after the chairman, Andrew Edwards. Its 
results were released in November 1998.
10 
Chairman Edwards did not see any reason for a major overhaul of the UK’s financial 
regulation. He concluded that the dependencies are in the top division of OFCs, finding 
that they have a reputation for “stability, integrity, professionalism, competence and 
good regulation”.
11 Nevertheless, the report delivers a vast array of recommendations, 
ranging from the creation of a financial ombudsman to strengthening the regulation of 
companies and disclosing more information.  
The UK Inland Revenue has targeted so-called “designer regimes” in OFCs. These 
regimes are specifically designed to enable companies to fit into tax-exempt categories 
onshore by establishing a corporate shell o ffshore. Therefore, so-called controlled 
foreign companies will no longer be able to avoid taxes at home. While the 
effectiveness of these measures has been called into doubt, it is another signal that the 
UK government is less tolerant of certain forms of OFC activity. 
In 1997, the National Audit Office argued that the UK might be exposed to certain risks 
emanating from among other things poor financial regulation and supervision in certain 
Overseas Territories.
12 As a response, the then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook undertook 
a far-reaching review of the relationship between the UK and its Overseas Territories.
13 
The aim was to insure that these OFCs continue to flourish “on the basis of compliance 
with standards and practices consistent with international norms”. The report strongly 
urged the territories to ensure that their financial regulation meets international 
standards. More specifically, Overseas Territories should implement measures to 
combat money laundering, provide regulators and law enforcers with adequate powers 
so that they can fully cooperate with their overseas counterparts on issues of 
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11 Ibid. 
12 UK National Audit Office (1997). 
13 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1999). MATTIAS LEVIN 
8 
investigation and enforcement, implement licensing and reporting requirements that 
ensure fair competition and establish independent regulatory authorities. The 
government commissioned KPMG, the audit and consultancy company, to carry out a 
survey of the state of financial regulation in these territories. Since its publication in 
October 2000: 
•  all territories have adopted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation; 
•  independent regulatory authorities have been established e.g. in Bermuda and the 
British Virgin Islands and one is being launched in the Cayman Islands; and 
•  all Overseas Territories are able to share information with foreign regulators (the 
exception being Anguilla).
14  
The government’s efforts to bring its OFCs into line was somewhat undermined when 
an investigation by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) into the role of 
Swiss banks in the laundering of proceeds from the late Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha 
revealed that banks located in London had played a key role.
15 Three specific facts 
made the story embarrassing in particular for the British government: 1) the story was 
revealed by the SFBC and not the FSA; 2) the British authorities were very slow off the 
mark in assisting Nigerian supervisors and 3) the OFCs targeted by the British 
government and the international community, e.g. Liechtenstein and Jersey, by contrast, 
quickly assisted the Nigerian supervisors and froze a number of accounts. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has restructured its fiscal relations with the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba. In the course of work on the Code of Conduct, the Netherlands reported its 
dependencies’ intention to “free themselves of the tax haven image”. In this respect, the 
parliament of the Netherlands Antilles enacted the New Fiscal Framework (NFF)., 
which abolished the distinction between offshore and onshore companies and 
introduced a flat 34.5% corporate income tax and a 10% withholding tax, among other 
measures. The new regime aims at achieving transparency, no ring fencing and clearly 
defined information exchange.
16 
The law entered into force in January 2001. Although the offshore regime was 
abolished, a grandfather clause ensures that companies set up before 2001 will continue 
to benefit from tax benefits at least until 2019, and exempted companies will continue to 
exist. 
The United States 
Long before the events of 11 September, the US was a driving force behind the 
increasing focus of attention on offshore financial centres. It was the US that initiated 
closer scrutiny of the Caribbean OFCs and lobbied hard in the various international 
organisations active in this field. The reasons for the US interest are related to drug 
trafficking and terrorism. In its efforts to stem drug abuse and root out terrorism, the US 
                                                 
14 UK Treasury Assessment, May 2002. 
15 Swiss Federal Banking Commission (2000). 
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found it effective to make it more difficult for terrorists or drug cartels to raise revenues 
or to process their revenues by inserting them into the financial system.  
Under the Clinton administration, the US concentrated its attention on two issues: tax 
evasion and money laundering. On tax evasion, it acted externally and internally. And 
externally, it has acted both unilaterally and multilaterally. Early on, the US made 
known its irritation over the presence of tax havens, or OFCs, in the Caribbean. The US 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) successfully convinced foreign banks to become 
“qualified intermediaries”, i.e. to act on behalf of the IRS in collecting taxes from US 
clients. The US has concluded over 60 bilateral tax treaties that provide for information 
exchange
17, and has combined these measures with multilateral cooperation in the 
context of the OECD. Internally, they have tried to modify the “deferral” behaviour of 
US firms, i.e. not sending home profits from foreign affiliates in order to avoid taxation. 
The US has also introduced legislation on controlled foreign companies. Under this 
legislation, the tax authorities may force a foreign subsidiary to repatriate its profits if it 
believes that the subsidiary is only used for tax purposes.  
Box 1. The collapse of Enron – Hiding profits and losses offshore 
In the wake of the collapse of Enron, it was discovered that the energy trader had pursued an 
aggressive tax-planning strategy. This s trategy had a common thread with Enron’s creative 
accounting, which consisted of hiding a substantial part of the company’s assets off the balance 
sheet in various controlled corporations. In the field of taxation, this meant an extensive use of 
subsidiaries and branches incorporated offshore. 
According to research done by Citizens for Tax Justice, a well respected if partisan (labour 
movement) association, Enron paid no income tax in four of the last five years. Instead, it 
placed its supposedly taxable profits in 881 subsidiaries in tax havens (692 in the Cayman 
Islands, 119 in the Turks and Caicos, 43 in Mauritius and 8 in Bermuda).  
Enron used a common technique among onshore companies; i.e. directing profits to an offshore 
partner which, after levying a fee, returns the profit onshore in a format that is not taxable 
according to onshore tax laws. An additional reason for Enron’s extensive use of tax havens was 
that it allowed the company to make deductions for share options. By placing the cost of these 
options offshore, Enron’s onshore balance sheet was not affected. 
Enron is not the only big American company not paying corporate taxes. In 1996, 16 out of half 
of the Fortune 500 companies paid no taxes, according to research by Citizens for Tax Justice. 
In 1998 that number had risen to 24. Nor is it uncommon to use tax havens for tax planning 
purposes, as indeed this paper shows. However, the extent to which Enron planted subsidiaries 
in tax havens is uncommon. Eager to distance itself from Enron, energy rival Dynergy (which 
had been poised to take over Enron just weeks before Enron’s implosion) stated on 16 January 
that it has no subsidiaries in tax havens. Another rival, ChevronTexaco, has three subsidiaries in 
tax havens while Exxon Mobil has six.  
Source: Johnston (2002). 
US support for curbing tax competition on a multilateral level fell significantly 
following the arrival of the Bush administration, at least on a rhetorical level. The US 
focus became more targeted on extracting agreement for information exchange with 
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obstinate OFCs, which directly resulted in the summer of 2001, in the OECD dropping 
its requirement that companies enjoying special tax privileges exercise substantial, i.e. 
real, economic activity. That the OECD managed to convince 20 out of 35 jurisdictions 
to start a process of cooperation is probably a sign that the US administration was 
eventually persuaded to let concern over lost tax revenues take precedent over 
ideological difficulties with the OECD’s attempts to impinge on jurisdictional 
competition.  
The same difference between administrations has not been observed in the matter of 
money laundering. Even before the terrorist attacks, preventing the laundering of 
illicitly obtained money ranked high on the US political agenda. In 2000, US law 
enforcers pledged to prosecute any bank involved in money laundering no matter what 
its nationality or where the crime has been committed. A US bank doing business in 
OFCs that are suspected of money laundering has to abide by harsh regulations 
regarding customer checks. The US has also exerted significant pressure on Caribbean 
OFCs to improve their regulation and supervision concerning money laundering.  
Box 2. The use of tax havens: The Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) regime in the US 
The inconsistent stance of the major nations on offshore centres is clearly illustrated by the fact 
that all try to attract as much wealth as possible, in some cases even with the deliberate use of 
OFCs. One form of this neo-mercantilist competition is exports, where states try to find 
legitimate ways of stimulating the sale of goods abroad. The US Foreign Sales Corporations 
(FSC) scheme is a good example. 
The US, unlike most other states, applies the principle of extraterritorial taxation by which all 
income earned by US companies around the world should be taxed. The EU, on the other hand, 
applies the territorial principle, which only taxes income earned within the EU. The US has tried 
to alleviate the competitive disadvantage by making exemptions to the general rule.  
One of these exemptions is the FSC. The FSC exempts a portion of the income of offshore 
subsidiaries (FSCs) of US companies from US income tax. If these subsidiaries base themselves 
in a tax haven, the US parent company reduces its tax bill. The gains are substantial. The 
reduction of the tax burden is estimated at between 15 to 30%. The European Commission 
claims that it gives an annual advantage of $4 billion to US companies that primarily are in 
industries in fierce competition with EU firms (e.g. chemicals, pharmaceuticals and mechanical 
machinery). 
The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) dispute settlement body ruled in February 2000, that 
the FSC is illegal under WTO rules because the US Treasury foregoes government revenue 
“otherwise due”. This amounts to an export subsidy, as its benefits are contingent upon export 
activity, which is illegal under WTO rules. The initial changes undertaken by the US were not 
regarded as sufficient by the EU, which took the issue back to the original panel. In January 
2002, the appellate body finally found that the law remained inconsistent with US obligations 
under the WTO.  
The FSC regime not only highlights how onshore countries find it convenient to use OFCs from 
time to time. The US is not the only culprit. European states also allow their companies to 
channel exports via tax havens, saving them over $10 billion a year (Hufbauer, 2000). It is also 
interesting to contrast the ease with which the OECD, the FSF and the FATF has clamped down 
on OFCs with the intricate and slow-moving legal wrangle between the US and the EU (the 
dispute of export subsidies started in 1971). Indeed, power makes all the difference. THE RISE OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES 
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Following the events of September 11th, the Bush administration froze the financial 
assets of individuals or organisations with alleged links to the perpetrators of the 
terrorist attacks. The administration further forbid US banks to engage in any financial 
transactions with these organisations. The administration also stated that foreign banks 
that did not observe the same rules would have their US assets frozen. This response 
clearly signals a significant shift in the level of punishment that the US is ready to 
inflict on those found guilty of money laundering.  
France 
France has traditionally been a vocal proponent of tax harmonisation and the fight 
against money laundering. This was reflected in the priorities of the French Presidency 
of the EU in 2000: tax harmonisation, the regulation of the international financial scene 
and the fight against money laundering in Europe. Moreover, France was a driving force 
in obtaining final approval of the EU savings tax directive. 
In addition, two Socialist MPs, Vincent Peillon and Arnaud Montebourg, heading a 
parliamentary committee, have presented studies on the City of London, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Monaco and, most recently, the City of London.
18 These reports combine 
a high tone with in-depth analysis, but they have not yet had any practical effect outside 
the borders of France.
19 
*** 
The picture that emerges from the above discussion is a sector that has increased rapidly 
since its origins in the 1960s but that is currently going through a challenging phase of 
adapting to evolving client needs and increasing competition from onshore financial 
centres. Countries have tried to handle the increasing use of OFCs unilaterally, but these 
unilateral attempts should be added the increasing number of multilateral attempts to 
rein in OFCs. The latter is the focus of the next chapter.  
                                                 
18 Assemblée nationale (2002). 
19 Ibid. Two subheads quoted from the reports will suffice: “Switzerland: A predator of global finance” 
and “The Abacha affair: An example of British lethargy”.  
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CHAPTER 2 
OFCS UNDER SIEGE 
2.1   Economic integration and collective action 
The international financial system is increasingly interdependent. 
Deliberately ... lax supervisory practices in one part of the system are a 
potential source of weakness to the entire system (Financial Stability Forum, 
2000a). 
The general context of this paper is collective action in an economically integrated 
world. The world economy is becoming more integrated, thanks to the ever-closer ties 
in the spheres of production, trade and finance. The fact that the political sphere’s basic 
unit remains the nation-state, however, creates problems, as individual states are 
increasingly unable to handle economic and political problems on their own.  
This paper focuses is on international policy action directed at offshore financial 
centres. This action has been taken in response to certain problems that have been 
exacerbated by globalisation, including 1) the difficulties of raising taxes in a global 
environment with jurisdictional tax competition, 2) the sensitive task of blocking the 
proceeds from criminal activity from entering the global financial system and 3) the 
challenge of ensuring systemic financial stability in a world of free-moving capital. In 
all three areas, the ability of nation-states to tackle these problems individually has 
significantly decreased, as capital has been liberalised, finance has been deregulated and 
production has become global.  
International policy cooperation and its problems 
Countries chose to cooperate because they realise that they cannot achieve certain goals 
by themselves. If unilateral action is effective, policy cooperation does not occur. The 
EU’s subsidiarity principle, in which Community action is only justified if regional or 
member state action is not efficient, is in line with this thinking.  
International policy cooperation can be defined as “actors adjust[ing] their behaviour to 
the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination.”
20 Concerted action between states can take many forms. Several authors 
have stressed an escalating process, starting with consultation (keeping other states 
informed about one’s actions) and ending with coordination, which entails a “significant 
modification of national policies”.
21 
There are several schools of thought on the likelihood of international collective action. 
Their respective views often depend on a broader assessment of international relations, 
as indicated in the following characterisations. 
•  Realists. Several observers think that the state is the key actor in world politics. 
States act rationally in order to maximise their self-interest. The defining feature of 
international relations is anarchy as there is no authority above the nation-state. 
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Accordingly, realists accord little hope or importance to policy coordination. In the 
context of OFCs, advocates of this school of thought are likely to argue that onshore 
states should act unilaterally with some level of force, as voluntary policy change on 
the part of OFCs is unlikely as long as it is against the OFCs’ national interests. 
•  Neo-realists. According to this line of thinking, the anarchic nature of international 
relations and the behaviour of states can be mitigated under certain conditions so 
that policy coordination can occur. The reason is that states focus on relative gains 
rather than absolute gains. That is, the importance is not so much if one wins or 
loses, but how much one wins or loses compared to other states. Coordination is 
hard to achieve and even harder to maintain. Even though states have multiple goals, 
the primary goal is power, not wealth. Therefore, coordination will not mitigate the 
anarchic nature of international relations. 
•  Neoliberal institutionalists. According to these theorists, coordination is not easy 
but possible, despite the anarchic n ature of international relations. States focus on 
absolute goals and pursue objectives other than power, e.g. wealth maximisation. As 
indicated by their label, these theorists attach much importance to institutions and 
regimes. They provide information, monitor compliance, increase contacts, facilitate 
issue linkages, define cheating and offer salient solutions. In short institutions and 
regimes facilitate the emergence and maintenance of coordination.
22  
The political economy of collective action is entirely different at the international level 
compared to the national scene. The extent of action therefore depends on several 
factors. Necessity is one; action is more likely if it is necessary. Possibility is another, as 
the extent and level of action depends  on how politically feasible it is. It is also 
dependent on the willingness of major actors to engage in it.  
Mancur Olsen’s seminal study on the problems of collective action found that the 
success of collective action depends on the number of actors involved, the range of 
possible solutions, the complexity of the issue and the distribution of costs and 
benefits.
23 Accordingly, coordination is more difficult if there are many actors, the issue 
is complex, there are many solutions to the problem involved and the distribution of 
costs and benefits is skewed. Conversely, research has shown that coordination is more 
likely to occur and be sustained if some of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
•  Actors are few, the problem straightforward and easy to solve and if everyone is 
benefiting or paying roughly the same (collective action theory, e.g. original 
GATT); 
•  Actors know that they will meet again (game theory, e.g. Council meetings in the 
EU);
24 
•  A framework of supporting principles, rules and decision-making procedures is in 
place (international regime theory, e.g. discussions on the new international 
financial architecture in the context of existing IMF structures);
25 
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•  A cadre of supporting technocrats carry out the coordination (epistemic community 
theory, e.g. the role of central bankers in European monetary integration);
26 
•  Domestic preferences favour coordination (thus the domestic political game 
matters), the distribution and balance of legislative powers is stable, and information 
about the policy coordination is widely dispersed;
27 and 
•  Power is distributed in an asymmetric way (hegemonic stability theory).
28 This may 
be counter-intuitive, but the logic is that once a major actor sets the rules of the 
game, cooperation is more likely to occur and be sustained.  
The last point is of particular importance in the field of tax and finance. 
Policy coordination in the sphere of international finance 
Cooperation in the sphere of international finance is heavily influenced by two factors: 
complexity and power. Externalities in the field of finance often require specific and 
detailed policy coordination responses. For example, the risk posed to the world 
financial system from the failure of international banks led to the establishment of the 
Basel Capital Adequacy Accord, which sets detailed rules for the capital that every bank 
must have in place. A second characteristic is that the location of financial services 
providers is unequally spread in the world. There are two major financial centres in the 
world: the City of London and New York. In addition, Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo, Zurich 
and a number of other cities provide significant financial services.  
Table 3. Policy coordination in the field of tax and finance 
  High incentives to emulate  Low incentives to emulate 
Significant 
negative 
externalities 
Dominant centre promotes 
harmonisation  
Followers adjust 
Dominant centre promotes 
harmonisation 
Followers resist 
Insignificant 
negative 
externalities 
Dominant centre promotes 
unilateralism 
Followers adjust. 
Dominant centre promotes 
unilateralism 
Followers resist 
Source: Simmons (2001). 
The effect of complexity and unequal power distribution is that policy coordination in 
the field of finance is not cooperative but rather the indirect result of states emulating 
the changes imposed by the major financial centres.
29 Even if other states do not 
immediately emulate the changes imposed by the dominating centres, the dominant 
centres have the ability to exert pressure and thus force change. The use of pressure 
becomes increasingly likely if the change is potentially costly for the dominant centres 
(e.g. the result of an increase in taxes or more burdensome regulation which may lead to 
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capital flight and de-location of financial institutions), i.e. it is associated with a 
negative externality. Similarly, other countries will be less inclined to change their 
policies if they stand to gain from the change in the dominant centres (e.g. inflow of 
funds or institutions), i.e. they have low incentives to emulate. According to this view, 
coordination in the sphere of finance can be summarised as indicated in the table above.  
The outcome in this table that is of interest in the context of this paper is the square in 
the top left-hand corner. The EU and the United States have higher taxes and regulatory 
standards than OFCs. As a result, they face a negative externality: outflow of capital, 
money laundering and financial stability risks. They therefore push for international 
policy coordination.  
Policy coordination in the field of offshore finance 
International policy action on OFCs provides a good case study of how globalisation 
changes the conditions of policy-making and the difficulty of achieving old policy goals 
with old instruments. The problems associated with offshore centres are such that 
unilateral or bilateral actions by individual countries are close to meaningless. One 
single country cannot control its tax base in an economically integrated world. One 
single country cannot solve the problem of money laundering if other countries continue 
to engage in it. One single country cannot increase the stability of the financial system if 
other countries continue to endanger it.  
Therefore, there is a rationale for coordination. In light of the prospects for successful 
policy coordination outlined above, however, coordination in the OFC area is difficult, 
as it involves many actors, a complex of issues and a skewed distribution of benefits 
and costs. Nevertheless, this has not decreased the enthusiasm with which the 
international community has tackled OFCs. Table 4 provides a summary of the recent 
and in some cases ongoing policy initiatives with an offshore connection.  
Of these, three areas of general concern stand out: circumstances where OFCs may 
endanger financial stability and offer opportunities for tax evasion or money laundering. 
The remainder of this chapter will assess how these concerns have been handled by the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the European 
Union (EU) and by key countries. MATTIAS LEVIN 
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Table 4. Summary of policy initiatives  
  Topic  Result 
Multilateral     
Basel Committee  Supervision of cross-border 
banking 
Survey on implementation of 
1996 report 
FATF  Identifying detrimental practices 
and non-cooperative jurisdictions 
List of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions established and 
reviewed; sanctions imposed 
on Nauru 
FSF  Potential effects of OFCs on 
global financial stability 
Categorisation of countries 
according to risks they pose to 
the financial system; certain 
offshore centres singled out  
G7  Cross-border cooperation between 
law enforcement and regulators 
Ten key principles 
OECD  Tax competition  List of 35 tax havens 
published; some jurisdictions 
have agreed to reform tax 
system 
Offshore Group 
of Banking 
Supervisors 
(OGBS) 
Evaluate OFCs compliance with 
Basel’s Core Principles  
Survey on implementation of 
1996 report 
United Nations  Develop minimum performance 
standards for OFCs 
Standards to be finalised 
Regional     
European Union  Code of conduct on harmful tax 
practices 
66 measures identified as harmful 
and due to be eliminated before 
January 2003 
Taxation of savings income  Agreement to exchange 
information so that EU citizens’ 
savings deposited in another 
member state can be taxed; 
agreement dependent upon 
cooperation from European OFCs. 
Money laundering  Update of EU legislation in order 
to widen what constitutes an 
offence and extending reporting 
requirements to non-financial 
professions  
State aid rules  Developing doctrine on state aid 
rules; aid to set up OFCs 
questioned by European 
Commission  OFCS UNDER SIEGE 
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Unilateral     
United States  Efforts to curb money 
laundering, terrorist financing 
and tax evasion 
National action plans on money 
laundering, establishment of list 
of terrorist organisations, freezing 
of accounts and information 
exchange agreements 
United Kingdom  Efforts to ensure proper 
regulation and supervision of 
associated territories and 
dependencies 
Edwards report, White papers, 
“KPMG report” 
Netherlands  Revision of tax links with 
associated territories 
Change in tax regime 
France  High political priority given to 
denouncing money laundering 
and tax evasion  
High-level support for FATF; 
hearings and reports on European 
financial centres in National 
Assembly 
2.2   The FSF – Threat to financial stability 
In March 2000, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) presented a report on OFCs which 
contained a key concern: while attracting large volumes of financial activity, OFCs 
often do not live up to international standards of supervision and information disclosure. 
In addition, OFCs make corporate structures and financial transactions complex and 
opaque.
30 In times of ever-increasing financial interdependence, this has the potential of 
endangering global financial stability.  
Lack of resources devoted to supervision 
The weakness in supervision and the failure to cooperate with other states lead to two 
sets of problems: prudential concerns and market integrity. Prudential concerns arise 
when internationally active financial intermediaries are not sufficiently supervised, 
thereby indirectly endangering international financial stability. The lack of supervision 
and international cooperation makes it more difficult to combat illegal activities and 
abusive market behaviour. This endangers market integrity.  
More specifically, by not exchanging information, OFCs block adequate access to 
information and the ability to verify information. This makes it more difficult to foster 
international cooperation so that financial stability can be harnessed. In addition, the 
lack of detailed data on OFCs’ financial activities makes it more difficult to monitor 
capital movements. Moreover, weak supervision undermines the consolidated 
supervision by the home supervisor of institutions active in OFCs, and the lack of due 
diligence and inadequate disclosure may facilitate inappropriate business structures. 
This makes supervision even more difficult. As many OFCs devote little resources to 
financial supervision, effective control is very hard to achieve.  
                                                 
30 Ibid. MATTIAS LEVIN 
18 
The Financial Stability Forum’s plan 
The aim of the FSF report is to bring all OFCs in  line with international standards of 
regulation, supervision, disclosure and information-sharing. While recognising that 
some OFCs are subject to prudential regulation and do disclose and share information, 
the FSF nevertheless states that certain OFCs “hinder efforts” to improve global 
financial supervision, “frustrate collective efforts” to improve financial stability and are 
“creating a potential systemic threat to the financial system”.
31  
The FSF wants OFCs to raise standards in three areas: cross-border cooperation, 
information sharing and confidentiality; supervisory powers and practices; and customer 
identification and record-keeping.
32 
In order to scrutinise the adherence to international standards the FSF carried out an 
initial assessment. The FSF asked both onshore and offshore supervisors for their 
judgement on various OFCs adherence to international standards. Based on these 
observations, the FSF released a report in spring 2000 dividing OFCs into three 
groups.
33  Group I   are those jurisdictions that cooperate, maintain high quality 
supervision and adhere to international standards. Group II are those jurisdictions that 
have institutions and procedures in place but that fail to implement them. Group III are 
those that have poor quality of supervision and that do not cooperate well with onshore 
supervisors and that do not try to adhere to international standards.
34  
Two European OFCs, Cyprus and Liechtenstein, were regarded as devoting so little 
resources to supervision and cooperation relative to their size that they were placed in 
group III. Andorra, Gibraltar and Monaco were placed in group II, while Guernsey, 
Jersey and the Isle of Man came out with honours. 
The FSF designed an assessment process divided into several stages, where the 
international community should help OFCs to undertake a self-assessment that would 
eventually lead to increasing adherence to standards. The FSF recommended that the 
IMF should be responsible for monitoring this process. Following this recommendation 
and after further endorsement by the G-7 meeting in Okinawa in July 2000, the IMF has 
agreed to assume this task.
35 This falls into line with the work on a new international 
financial architecture that the Fund has undertaken since the Asian crisis.
36 In March 
2002, a first progress review was undertaken. Progress was deemed generally 
satisfactory, with only a handful of OFCs not yet scheduled for an IMF assessment.. 
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33 Financial Stability Forum (2000b). 
34 Financial Stability Forum (2000a). 
35 G-7 (2000) and IMF (2000b).  
36 Since the Asian crisis, the IMF has tried to build a stronger international financial system. It has 
concentrated on five major areas: transparency, international standards, financial sector strengthening, 
involving the private sector and systemic improvements (IMF intervention funds). For further work on 
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2.3   The OECD – Harmful tax competition 
The second area of concern is taxation. One of OFCs’ main attractions is their low level 
of taxation. For onshore countries, this poses the risk of an exodus of their mobile 
activities (such as financial capital).  
Poaching the tax base of other countries? 
According to the OECD, tax havens are defined as:  
•  Jurisdictions that have no or only nominal taxes; 
•  Jurisdictions that do not engage effectively in exchanging information with foreign 
supervisors; 
•  Jurisdictions whose regimes lack transparency, or have inadequate regulatory 
supervision or financial disclosure; and 
•  Jurisdictions that facilitate establishment of foreign-owned entities without the need 
for a local substantive presence, or prohibit these entities from having any 
commercial impact on the local economy (ring fencing).
37  
While there is no clear economic case for tax harmonisation, as preferences about the 
appropriate tax level legitimately differ between countries, a majority of OECD states 
argue that tax competition can be harmful. Harmful tax practices are said to erode the 
tax base of other countries.
38 The harmful feature is not necessarily a race to the bottom, 
which is not proved empirically, but rather an increasingly skewed distribution of the 
tax burden. As certain mobile components of the tax base escape taxation, other less 
mobile components have to compensate by paying more tax. In other words, the 
deterioration of the tax system is not illustrated so much by a generalised reduction of 
revenues, but rather by an increasing imbalance in the tax system.
39 
Figure 1. Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2000). 
                                                 
37 OECD (2000d). 
38 OECD (2000a). 
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No firm evidence can be found that there is a race to the bottom, as overall tax revenues 
have not decreased. There nevertheless appears to be an increasing imbalance in 
onshore tax systems. Some evidence suggest that mobile tax sources pay less tax, while 
the tax burden appears to be shifted onto immobile tax sources (e.g. income tax) and 
levied in more indirect ways (e.g. VAT).
40 As can be seen from the graphs, labour 
yields substantially more tax revenues than companies.
41 However, since 1975 the 
difference has remained stable, or even decreased. This would seem to suggest that the 
argument of a wide shift of the tax burden towards labour is refuted. However, if one 
looks at another measure of taxation, some support emerges. The effective tax burden 
on capital has decreased from 45% to 35% between 1981 and 1996. During the same 
time, the effective tax burden on labour has increased from 35 to 42%.
42 The most 
pronounced change has, however, been in social security contributions. Revenues from 
social security contributions have increased from 6.3% of GDP in 1965 to 11.4% in 
1998 (from 22.8% to 27.8% as share of total taxation).
43 
Figure 2. Different taxes as share of GDP in the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2000e). 
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41 There are several problems with the statistics, however. For example, the measure for labour taxation – 
personal income – includes taxation of personal capital income.  
42 Lautenberg (1999). Capital taxes are, however, borne both by individuals and companies. It is therefore 
not a conclusive evidence of a shift in burden. 
43 The rise in social security contributions is probably explained by the increase in aggregate welfare 
spending, related to the increase in unemployment, an older population and more generous healthcare 
programmes. There are, however, wide differences in the relative importance of contributions. In some 
countries, welfare is financed nearly entirely by general government tax revenues and as a result 
contributions account for a very low share in the tax mix (e.g. Denmark 3%). In a large part of continental 
Europe social security systems are based on the so-called “Bismarck model”, where social security is seen 
as an insurance and contributions and benefits depend on the wage of the worker. In these countries, 
contributions account for a much larger share of the tax mix (e.g. Germany 40%). In times of fiscal crises, 
reliance on contribution funded welfare schemes have increased (e.g. Denmark from 1980-85, and 
Sweden from 1990-95). 
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The OECD initiative 
The OECD has since the mid-1990s developed measures to counter the “distorting 
effects of harmful tax competition”. A report on harmful tax competition released in 
1998 led to the creation of the OECD Forum on Tax Harmonisation. The Forum’s remit 
is to identify harmful tax practices within member states and remove them by the end of 
the year 2005. The forum, additionally, encourages non-member countries to associate 
themselves with the OECD guidelines. The objective is to enable states to tax their 
subjects as they may wish, to promote a fair distribution of the tax burden and ensure 
that taxes are not the main reason for deciding where to allocate capital.  
In April 2000, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released a report on  bank 
secrecy.
44 The unique characteristic is that the report was adopted unanimously; all 29 
members approved (including Switzerland and Luxembourg). The report proposes 
certain measures in order to limit bank secrecy, as follows: First, eliminate anonymous 
accounts and require identification of bank customers and beneficial owners. Second, 
re-examine “domestic tax interest requirement”, i.e. countries should not require a 
national interest in order to disclose information. Third, re-examine policies and 
practices that prevent information exchange for criminal tax cases. Fourth, take more 
initiatives to achieve access to bank information for civil tax cases. The goal, according 
to the OECD, is not to end bank secrecy, but to deal with dishonest taxpayers in order to 
maintain confidence in the fairness of the tax system.  
In June 2000, the Forum named 35 jurisdictions (most of them OFCs) that met the tax 
haven criteria.
45 These jurisdictions were encouraged to start a process of cooperation 
with the OECD before the end of February 2002, in order to eliminate their harmful tax 
practices before the end of 2005. Despite a protracted battle between OFCs and the 
OECD, more than 20 jurisdictions, among them Cyprus, the Channel Islands, Isle of 
Man, Malta and San Marino, had decided to cooperate when the deadline expired in 
February 2002.
46 Those jurisdictions that have not initiated a process of change will 
face counter-measures by OECD members. These will range from the termination of 
existing tax conventions with the jurisdictions concerned to the imposition of additional 
burdens on financial institutions dealing with these OFCs. 
Box 3. Possible counter-measures by the OECD 
•  Disallow deductions, exemptions or credits related to transactions 
•  Compulsory transaction reporting rules 
•  Comprehensive penalty scheme 
•  Withholding taxes on certain payments to residents in tax havens 
•  Deny availability of foreign tax credit 
•  Transactional charges (“levies”) on certain transactions 
Source: OECD (2000d). 
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A complicating factor is that the OECD has no power to enforce implementation of its 
recommendations, but is dependent upon its members to implement agreed sanctions. 
Although it is therefore not yet clear whether the counter-measures will be carried out 
and in what form, the OECD process has gone further than many observers expected 
two years ago. That nearly 60% of the designated tax havens have signed up is a clear 
sign of success. The OECD has therefore managed to overcome the lack of a clear 
economic case, the complex issues and the complexity of dealing with many actors.  
It is difficult to say to what extent the events of September 11 contributed to the 
jurisdictions’ decisions to make commitments before the OECD deadline. Modifications 
to the OECD project were decided before the events, notably dropping the substantial 
activity criteria, but it is probable that the terrorist attacks tipped the balance towards a 
cooperative stance. Although a majority of targeted OFCs has decided to cooperate, a 
substantial minority (15 OFCs) has nevertheless not committed themselves so far to 
cooperate. 
2.4  The FATF – Money laundering 
Money laundering is the “process of introducing the proceeds of crime into the 
legitimate stream of financial commerce by masking their origin”.
47 It has been 
estimated that money laundering amounts to $600 billion a year, or between 2 to 5% of 
the world’s GDP. Money laundering fuels criminal activity and erodes the integrity of 
financial institutions. In small and vulnerable economies it may go as far as to 
undermine the official economy and to significantly hamper the power of the state. Due 
to the interconnectedness of the international financial system, the efforts to combat 
money laundering are not stronger than its weakest part. OFCs have proven to be a 
weak spot in this respect. 
Bank secrecy as a veil  
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) has identified a 
number of rules and procedures in OFCs that prevent the effective combating of the 
laundering of proceeds emanating from criminal activities. These include: 
•  No or inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions, 
•  Inadequate rules for the licensing and creation of financial institutions, 
•  Inadequate customer identification requirements for financial institutions, 
•  Lack of identification of beneficial owners of legal and business entities, 
•  Laws or regulations prohibiting international exchange of information, and 
•  In some cases, obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to pledges of 
assistance.
48 
Most OFCs have bank secrecy. In the “respectable” ones (e.g. Switzerland), it can be 
lifted by order of a judge if there is proof or suspicion of criminal activity. Nevertheless, 
bank secrecy makes the task of collecting evidence more difficult, as the police cannot 
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go on “fishing expeditions”, i.e. to screen a bank’s entire set of accounts in search of 
any suspicious transaction.  
OFCs may not only attract questionable activities. They may also undermine 
international efforts to combat these very activities. It is important to reiterate what was 
stated above, i.e. the OFC community is not homogeneous. Some OFCs do cooperate 
and provide information and exercise scrupulous supervision and regulation. In 
addition, the relatively small size of their financial systems should make it easier to 
screen.
49 Nevertheless, all OFCs are characterised by a mix of low taxation, low 
regulation and secrecy, which make OFCs a thriving ground for individuals and 
business trying to avoid attention.  
The FATF programme  
Attempts to curb money laundering at the multilateral level are embodied in  the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering. It was set up by the G7 at 
its meeting in Paris 1989 and presented 40 recommendations in 1990, which have since 
become the benchmark for money laundering legislation world-wide.
50 In order to 
ensure that these recommendations gain world-wide effect, the FATF has developed 25 
criteria for defining countries that do not implement these recommendations (“non-
cooperative”). The criteria focus on: 
•  Loopholes in financial regulations that allow no or inadequate supervision of the 
financial sector, weak licensing or customer identification requirements, excessive 
financial secrecy provisions, or lack of suspicious transaction reporting systems.  
•  Weaknesses in commercial requirements including the identification of beneficial 
ownership and the registration procedures of business entities.  
•  Obstacles to international cooperation, regarding both administrative and judicial 
levels.  
•  Inadequate resources for preventing, detecting and repressing money laundering 
activities.
51  
The FATF charged four regional groups with the task of reviewing jurisdictions within 
their region against these criteria. In Europe, the responsible body is a select committee 
of the Council of Europe (PC-R-EV).
52  
In June 2000, the FATF presented an initial shortlist of non-cooperative jurisdictions.
53 
At that time, Liechtenstein was the only European OFC to be judged to have “serious 
systemic problems”. However, since then Liechtenstein and some of the other 
blacklisted jurisdictions have taken measures that have allowed them to be taken off the 
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51 FATF (2000a). 
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list.
54 Several offshore and onshore centres nevertheless remain on the list. So far, the 
FATF has imposed sanctions on Nauru (5 December 2001) and is closely observing the 
Philippines where pending legislation is judged to be deficient.
55  
Table 5. FATF’s blacklist (as of February 2002)  
Cook Islands  Hungary  Myanmar  Russia 
Dominica  Indonesia  Nauru  St Kitts and Nevis 
Egypt  Israel   Nigeria  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Grenada  Lebanon  Niue  Ukraine 
Guatemala  Marshall Islands  Philippines   
Source: FATF (2002). 
Box 4. FATF counter-measures against non-cooperative jurisdictions and territories 
Generally, FATF sanctions against states that do not implement the principles are governed by 
Recommendation 21, according to which financial institutions should give “special attention” to 
businesses and transactions from countries that do not apply the recommendations. The 
institutions should also examine suspicious transactions from such countries and make the 
findings available to supervisors. Following the publication of the 2000 report, the FATF has 
developed an additional set of sanctions that should be taken in concert by all member states 
and be “gradual, proportionate and flexible” in their means: 
•  “Stringent requirements for identifying clients and enhancement of advisories, including 
jurisdiction-specific financial advisories, to financial institutions for identification of the 
beneficial owners before business relationships are established with individuals or 
companies from these countries; 
•  Enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions 
on the basis that financial transactions with such countries are more likely to be suspicious; 
•  In considering requests for approving the establishment in FATF member countries of 
subsidiaries or branches or representative offices of banks, taking into account the fact that 
the relevant bank is from an NCCT;  
•  Warning non-financial sector businesses that transactions with entities within the NCCTs 
might run the risk of money laundering.” 
Source: FATF (2001a). 
Following the events of 11 September, the FATF in October 2001 broadened its area of 
competence to cover terrorism financing as well. FATF members agreed upon eight 
special recommendations to be implemented by all members before June 2002. These 
are summarised in the table below. Non-members are “invited” to undertake a similar 
assessment before May 2002. Countries unwilling to implement the recommendations 
will face sanctions.  
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Table 6. The FATF’s special recommendations on terrorist financing 
1.  Ratify and implement the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 
2.  Include terrorism in predicate offences under money laundering rules 
3.  Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets 
4.  Impose reporting requirements on suspicious transactions related to terrorism 
5.  Formalise greatest possible measure of mutual legal assistance and information exchange in 
connection with terrorism 
6.  Set up licensing and registering system for money/value transmission services 
7.  Force financial institutions to include originator information on funds transfers and related 
messages that are sent through the payment chain 
8  Review laws relating to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism (e.g. NGOs) 
Source: FATF (2001b). 
Apart from this immediate response, it may well be that the terrorist attacks are altering 
what has been politically achievable so far. For example, the FATF does not want to 
abolish bank secrecy, but requires it to be lifted in cases of proof of criminal activity. 
This is supposed to be effective with active supervision and strong enforcement. It is 
clear, however, that banking secrecy makes the task of collecting proof of financial 
crime harder. Will this be acceptable to US authorities responsible for investigating the 
financial trail of the terrorists? Will they be able to convince OFCs to lift bank secrecy 
even if firm proof does not exist, or does it have to be abolished altogether? Although 
there was no support for scrapping bank secrecy before the attacks on the US, the 
conditions may have changed. 
2.5  The EU – Obstacles to the integrity of the single market 
With the launch of the euro, a further qualitative step has been taken on the road 
towards achieving a truly single market. The immediate effect of the launch has been to 
expose any remaining obstacles, including taxation, state aid and money laundering. 
Offshore centres are as such not the main motivation of these policy developments. The 
proposed policies, however, significantly affect them. 
The Code of Conduct on harmful tax practices 
On 1 December 1997, the European Council agreed on a package of measures to 
combat harmful tax competition in the EU. The Monti Group (so-called after its 
chairman, the then Internal Market Commissioner Mario Monti) outlined three areas 
where further action was needed to combat harmful tax competition and create a truly 
single market. These were business taxation, taxation on interest income from savings 
investment, and withholding taxes on cross-border interest and royalty payments 
between companies. 
The initiative stemmed from the overall assessment that taxation on income from labour 
was becoming too heavy as a result of a downward spiral of unfair tax competition 
between the member states to attract investment. This was considered harmful since it 
led to a loss of tax revenue, distorted the single market and undermined employment. MATTIAS LEVIN 
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Two of the areas have links with OFCs: the code of conduct on corporate taxation and 
the new proposal for a directive on the taxation of income from savings. 
For a long time, the EU’s approach differed from the OECD’s attempts to curb harmful 
tax practices. Unlike the OECD, the EU did not focus on mobile financial activities, but 
instead took a broader approach bringing in the whole of business taxation. In addition, 
while the OECD clearly favoured an information exchange system, the EU pushed for a 
withholding tax. Moreover, the OECD political agenda is  – essentially  – to put 
administrations in a position where they can tax their residents. The idea is one of 
‘looking through’ the dark glass of tax havens and tax residents. There is no attempt to 
defend the social market economy or comparatively high levels of taxation – a goal that 
is instead shared by some, although certainly not by all – EU policy-makers. 
On business taxation, initial results were obtained with the publication of the Primarolo 
report (Council of the EU, 1999) in November 1999, which identified 66 measures in 
the member states that were considered harmful, i.e. “tax measures which provide for a 
significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels 
which generally apply in the Member State in question”. Among the categories covered 
were measures relating to offshore companies and harmful measures applied in 
associated and dependent territories. On 27 November 2000, the Ecofin Council decided 
that these measures should be dismantled before 1 January 2003.  
On taxation of savings income, a substantial breakthrough was achieved at the Feira 
European Council. After successful lobbying by the UK, the EU fell into line with 
international trends and decided, although hesitantly and with certain key preconditions, 
to eventually adopt information exchange as the basis of taxation of savings income. 
The details of the agreement are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. The Feira European Council agreement on the taxation of savings 
Basis  Exchange of information as the basis for taxation of savings income of non-
residents. 
Timetable  Agreement on the substantial content of the Directive before 31 December 2000. 
Adopt the Directive, by unanimity, no later than 31 December 2002. 
  Implement exchange of information as soon as conditions permit, and  no later 
than seven years after the entry into force of the directive. 
Contents  •  In years 1 through 7, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg apply a withholding 
tax of 20%, the other member states apply information exchange. 
•  From year 7 onwards, all member states apply information exchange. 
•  25% of the revenues from the withholding tax will be sent to the home 
country of the non-resident saver. 
•  The directive will cover bank deposits and investment funds with less than 
40% in interest-generating bonds. 
Preconditions  The directive will only be adopted if there are sufficient assurances that:  
•  the same measures are applied in  dependent or associated territories (the 
Channel Islands, Isle of Man, dependent or associated territories in the 
Caribbean) and  
•  equivalent measures  are applied in the  US and key third countries 
(Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino). 
Source: Council of the European Union (2000a). OFCS UNDER SIEGE 
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The concern of Luxembourg (the main proponent of a withholding tax) was that the 
adoption of information exchange, thereby scrapping the cherished practice of bank 
secrecy, would lead to an exodus of financial capital to third countries. Therefore, the 
Feira agreement was made dependent on similar measures being adopted by the US and 
key third countries. The European Council accordingly charged the European 
Commission to enter into discussions with these countries immediately. 
State aid and taxation 
State aid in any form, including taxation, is normally prohibited in the EU. There are, 
however, certain exceptions (see box below). These exceptions have theoretically 
created the possibility for the so-called outermost regions to set up an OFC for 
development purposes.
56 The only region to have done so is Madeira (see section 3.7).  
Box 5. State aid rules in the EU 
What tax measures constitute state aid? 
1.  The measure must relieve a company from a charge that it would normally have borne in 
the budget. This reduction in the tax burden may come from a reduction in the tax base, a 
total or partial reduction in the  amount of tax or the deferment, cancellation or special 
rescheduling of tax debt.  
2.  The advantage must be granted by the state or through state resources (regional or local 
bodies included). 
3.  The measure must affect competition and trade between member states.  
4.  The measure must be specific/selective in the sense that it favours “certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods”.  
What derogations may be granted? 
1.  Specific measures may be permitted if they are shown to derive directly from the “guiding 
principles of the tax system”.  
2.  More importantly, state aid may be allowed to the so-called outermost regions (Madeira, 
Azores, etc.) provided that they are justified and that the level is proportional to the 
handicaps the aid is supposed to alleviate. Normally, such aid has to be degressive and 
limited in time. However, state aid that is not degressive and time limited may be granted to 
outermost regions in order to offset additional costs resulting from factors mentioned in 
Article 299(2) of the Treaty. However, the region must prove that such handicaps exist. 
3.  Aid to promote economic development may also be permitted, provided that it is supplied 
roughly under the same conditions as outlined above (proportional, targeted). In addition, 
the aid must contribute to activities with a local impact and relate to local handicaps. 
Source: Commission’s clarifying note on tax and state aid (98/C 384/03), Amendments to guidelines on 
national regional aid (00/C 258/06). 
So far, the European Commission has approved those attempts. In the current review of 
the Madeira regime, however, the Commission has expressed increasing concerns and 
reservations over allowing state aid to attract offshore  financial activities. The 
Commission considers that such financial activities do not contribute sufficiently to the 
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local economy in order to be eligible under state aid rules and that the development 
benefits are not proportional to the aid granted.
57 The Commission has not yet taken a 
decision, however. 
The EU programme on money laundering 
Following September 11, the EU’s institutions managed to reach an agreement on the 
update of the money laundering directive. Before the September events, the directive 
had been stuck in co-decision due to disagreement between the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council. The disagreement related to two issues:  
i)  the widening of what constitutes money laundering offence to include all organised 
crime and not only drug trafficking, and 
ii)  the extension of the obligations of the directive (e.g. reporting requirement) to 
cover certain non-financial activities and professions (lawyers and accountants).  
The agreement reached by the Conciliation Committee in mid-October and voted 
through in the European Parliament’s third reading on 13 November 2001,  is a 
compromise whereby which the directive was indeed extended to cover all crimes. 
Reporting requirements were also extended under  certain conditions to  some non-
financial professions that are vulnerable to money laundering attempts, as follows: 
•  Notaries and independent legal professionals will be covered by the obligations of 
the directive when participating in “financial or corporate transactions, including 
providing tax advice”.  
•  Lawyers and other legal advisers are exempt from the reporting requirement on 
information “obtained either before, during or after judicial proceedings, or in the 
course of ascertaining the legal position for a client.” Therefore, legal advice will  
continue to be subject to professional secrecy “unless the legal counsellor is taking 
part in money laundering activities, the legal advice is provided for money 
laundering purposes, or the lawyer know that the client is seeking legal advice for 
money laundering purposes.”
58  
*** 
Well before the terrorist attacks on the US, there was significant attention on OFCs 
from major states and international organisations. The result of this attention was not 
conclusive however. The effects of the terrorist attack seem to have mustered sufficient 
political will to draw these processes to their end: progress in the OECD and FATF 
initiatives seems to suggest an increasing likelihood that sanctions may be imposed on 
those OFCs that shelter money launderers, pose a threat to financial stability and do not 
exchange information for tax purposes. How a number of European OFCs score in this 
respect is the focus of the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
he ambition of this survey is to assess how some of the European OFCs 
compare with respect to the concerns raised above. While the large number of 
OFCs and their heterogeneity make comparisons difficult, the OFCs included in 
this survey (Andorra, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, 
Madeira and Monaco) are all either located in Europe, under the jurisdiction dependent 
of a European country or, as in one case, are an integral part of an EU member state. 
The survey does not include all European OFCs and there are certain countries that 
perhaps could or should have been included (e.g. Cyprus, Malta, San Marino). 
Moreover, the  City of London,  Ireland, Luxembourg  and Switzerland are providing 
significant services for non-residents, but because they serve such large domestic 
economies and provide such a full range of services that they were deemed to be RFCs 
(see above).  
It should be remembered that there are other regions with OFCs that are much larger. 
The  Caribbean is home to some of the most famous and notorious of these (e.g. 
Antigua, Bermuda and Cayman Islands). Some of these have constitutional ties with an 
EU member state (e.g. the Bahamas, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands are 
territories of the UK and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are connected to the 
Netherlands). There are some very prominent OFCs in Asia and the Pacific (Hong 
Kong, Singapore). Some countries in the  Middle East (Israel, Lebanon) and  Africa 
(Tangier, Liberia) also offer offshore services. Therefore, OFCs are a global 
phenomenon and compete in a global context. This is important to keep in mind for 
those who would require the European OFCs to mend their ways. The offshore business 
is extremely footloose: there are little physical installations that deter offshore 
institutions from moving if the margin of tax and regulatory benefits change to a 
particular jurisdiction’s disadvantage.  
A fundamental difficulty when analysing OFCs is the lack of data. As mentioned above, 
most OFCs do not disclose data to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and 
very few, if any, surveys exist. In addition, most OFCs are very small states, with 
limited national accounts and small civil services. Moreover, data are sometimes not 
comparable. Funds under management are sometimes included in bank deposits; what 
falls under the label “company” sometimes includes foundations and trusts, and 
sometimes not.  
Consequently, any comparison should be taken with a dose of scepticism. The 
following comparison is based on BIS and IMF estimates, surveys in journals and 
periodicals, and to a large extent, public information disclosed by the OFCs themselves. 
Table 8 provides a summary of the findings concerning these OFCs in terms of financial 
size and tax regimes. 
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Table 8. A survey of selected OFCs  
a) Financial size (2001, or the most recent year available) 
  Andorra  Gibraltar  Guernsey  Isle of 
Man 
Jersey  Liechten
-stein 
Madeira  Monaco 
Population  65,939  27,649  58,681  71,714  85,200  32,491  261,800  29,972 
GDP per capita, €  21,645  18,940  32,054  21,383  26,000  53,570  9,145  27,000 
Bank deposits, €bn  8.1  9.1
a  132.0  43.6  211.9  19.3  2.9
b  43.3 
Funds under 
management, €bn 
n.a.  n.a.  48.5  7.9  155.7  80.9  n.a.  39.6 
Insurance assets, €bn  n.a.  0.4  14.4  29.6  0.9  0.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Offshore companies  n.a.  8,800
c  15,453  41,747  35,000  80,000  5,931  n.a. 
Number of banks  6  18  76  60  70  16  41  40 
Employees in finance 
sector 
1,328  2,200  6,500  5,400  7,600  1,400  590  1,700 
Share of total 
employment, % 
19  n.a.  21  26  n.a.  n.a.  3  6 
Contribution of 
offshore sector to 
economy, % 
5  25
d  46  41  55  23  13
e  50 
a  Offshore business only: €3.2bn (IMF, 2001). 
b  Deposits by emigrants held offshore in the MIBC 1997. This excludes deposits held by other non-residents, 
e.g. from the EU. Therefore, the real number is larger.  Most of the banking entities in the MIBC are 
external branches, and therefore they consolidate deposits at Head Office level.  
c  Total number of registered companies is 28,500, of which 8,800 are exempt and another 146 qualifying 
companies with substantially reduced tax rates (IMF, 2001). 
 
d  Estimated contribution of financial sector (both on- and offshore) to the economy (IMF, 2001).
 
e  Based on a study carried out by the regional government in 1997. The figure is based on value-added. 
Sources: Jurisdictions, IMF, Standard & Poor's, CIA and http://www.lowtax.net. 
b) Tax measures 
  Andorra  Gibraltar  Guernsey  Isle of 
Man
a  
Jersey  Liechten-
stein 
Madeira  Monaco 
Direct taxes                 
Corporate tax   0%  £225 <  0-30%  0-15%  0-30%  2‰-20%  0-12.5%
a  0-33% 
Personal income tax   0%  < £10,000  20%  10-15%  20%  3.6-
18.6% 
14-40%  0%
c 
Indirect taxes                 
VAT  1-12%  0%  0%  17.5%
b  0%  7.5%  17%  5.5-
17.5% 
Withholding tax  0  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Stamp duty  0  0  0%  0%  0%  2%  0%  0% 
Excise taxes  Y  0  0%  0%  0%  Y  0%  0% 
Cooperation                 
Double taxation 
treaties 
0  0  1  1  2  2  32  1 
a Not yet effective.  
b Offset by generous allowances. 
c Not applicable to French citizens. 
Sources: Jurisdictions, IMF and http://www.lowtax.net.  A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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The OFCs also have different attitudes towards disclosing data. Certain OFCs (e.g. the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) have excellent web resources and disclose 
financial data, but they remain the exception rather than the norm. Overall, it is clear 
that some European OFCs correspond more clearly to the traditional image of OFCs as 
opaque and secretive.  
As can be seen from the table, these OFCs have different specialisations. As illustrated 
by the graph below, Jersey has the largest bank sector followed by Guernsey and the 
Isle of Man. This is still very little compared to the Cayman Islands, where banks have 
assets estimated at €740 billion. Regarding asset management, Jersey manages funds 
worth €156 billion. Liechtenstein also hosts a significant asset management industry, 
worth €81billion. The insurance industry is generally less developed, with the Isle of 
Man and Guernsey as the only (confirmed) European players.  
 
Sources: Jurisdictions, Standard & Pool’s, CIA and http://www.lowtax.net. 
Liechtenstein is the most popular destination for offshore companies in Europe followed 
by the Isle of Man and Cyprus. However, the Liechtenstein definition of what 
constitutes a company is more inclusive than many other OFCs (e.g. Liechtenstein 
includes foundations). Moreover, by international standards, this number of offshore 
companies is not that much. Hong Kong has close to 500,000 companies and the British 
Virgin Islands over 300,000.
59   
3.1  Andorra 
Andorra is a co-principality. The co-princes are the French President and the Bishop of 
Urgell. Andorra gained divided sovereignty in 1278 but it was not until 1993 that it 
became fully sovereign. The General Council, elected by the people every four years, 
governs the principality.  
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Andorra is not a member of the EU, but is part of the customs union. It is therefore 
treated as an EU member in issues related to trade in manufacturing products, where it 
enjoys zero tariffs. While tourism is the main source of income (80% of GDP), the 
banking sector also makes a substantial contribution to the economy (13% of GDP).  
Table 9. Andorra’s financial centre 
Population  65,939 
GDP per capita, €  21,645 
Bank deposits, €bn  8.1 
Number of banks  6 
Employees in financial sector  1,328 
Share of total employment, %  19 
Contribution of offshore sector to the local 
economy, % 
5 
Source: Chamber of Commerce of Andorra. 
A substantial amount,  €8.1  billion, is deposited in Andorra’s banks. According to 
official figures, the financial sector employs nearly one-fifth (19%) of Andorra’s 
workforce. In all, the financial sector consists of six banks, nine financial institutions 
other than banks and around 40 insurance companies.  
It is difficult for foreigners to establish a commercial presence in Andorra. Foreign 
ownership is limited to 33%, except in banking where foreigners are allowed to have a 
majority stake (51%). In addition, law prohibits fiduciary contracts or using an 
Andorran individual as a nominee. Moreover, Andorran law does not recognise trusts. 
Accordingly, it is fair to say that Andorra is not a centre for offshore companies.  
Financial supervision 
Until 1993, the banks regulated Andorra’s financial system. The enactment of the Law 
Governing the Financial System (LOSF) introduced a complementary regulatory layer 
of “technical bodies” set up by the government. The National Andorran Institute of 
Finance (INAF) has since then been responsible f or supervising all financial 
institutions. It also advises the government on financial regulation, maintains relations 
with foreign supervisors and enforces rules.  
Money laundering 
Since 1990, Andorran banks have operated under a due diligence code. The same year 
money laundering became an offence under the Criminal Code. In 1995, Andorra 
enacted the Law on the Protection of Bank Secrecy and the Prevention of Money 
Laundering. Violating bank secrecy is a criminal offence, which may lead to prison. It is 
only possible to violate secrecy on the command of a judge. Nevertheless, the law also 
imposes requirements regarding reporting, supervision and cooperation that banks are 
“expected to comply with” when money laundering is suspected. In 1998, the 
Government set up a special commission with the task of reviewing and strengthening 
anti-money laundering regulation. The Commission may propose the creation of a A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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Financial Information Unit. Moreover, in April 1999, the Andorran parliament ratified 
the proposal to sign the Vienna and Strasbourg Conventions on money laundering.  
While having gained a “very positive overall impression concerning Andorra’s anti-
money laundering regime”, the Council of Europe, which is responsible for the FATF’s 
assessments in the wider Europe, raised some important concerns:  
•  The exception to bank secrecy (request by a judge) is contested in civil proceedings. 
Bank secrecy continues to be rigorously defended, notably by violations falling 
under the criminal code. Moreover, it is difficult for foreign authorities to gain 
access to information protected by secrecy. 
•  A very limited number of offences are listed as predicate in the Criminal Code (drug 
trafficking, sequestration, illegal arms sales, prostitution and terrorism). This makes 
it difficult to fight money laundering and to cooperate internationally. 
•  International cooperation is made even more difficult since Andorra has no 
multilateral treaties or legislation on international cooperation. 
•  Due diligence obligations applies only to banks. 
•  Andorra has numbered accounts. 
•  While banks have an obligation to report suspicious transactions, there is no 
sanction if they choose not to.
60 
Tax regime 
Andorra levies no taxes on personal or corporate income. The only taxes it levies are an 
indirect goods tax (IMI) ranging between 1 to 12%, customs duties, social security 
charges and taxes on for example motor vehicles and gambling. Accordingly, the 
OECD classified Andorra as a tax haven. In addition, Andorra has no double taxation 
treaties. It exchanges no information for tax purposes with other countries. Although 
information exchange is facilitated in the case of serious crimes, this does not include 
tax evasion. 
3.2  Gibraltar 
Gibraltar has been “part of her Majesty’s dominions” since 1704 and is currently a UK 
overseas territory. It was ceded to the UK by Spain in 1713 under the Treaty of Utrecht 
and became a crown colony in 1830. The 1969 Constitution defines the powers of the 
local government (e.g. fiscal affairs), leaving all remaining areas to the  Crown’s 
representative, the Governor (notably all areas that might have a “conceivable impact on 
the security of the fortress”). Gibraltar implements all EU legislation apart from matters 
relating to the Common Agricultural Policy, the common customs tariff and the 
harmonisation of turnover taxes (i.e. VAT). It is therefore part of the internal market. 
Gibraltar’s financial centre dates back from 1967 when a special tax regime for 
international business (tax exempt companies) was created.
61 This was further 
developed in the early 1980s with the “Income Tax Ordinance”. Banks and investment 
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management dominate the financial sector. The institutions mainly, but not only, serve 
the wealthy expatriates living in southern Spain. A crucial element in Gibraltar’s 
commercial prospects is its ability to “passport” financial services to the EU/EEA, i.e. 
enabling institutions approved in Gibraltar to provide their services across the EU/EEA. 
In principle, this should only depend on whether the UK judges that Gibraltar’s 
financial regulation is stringent enough (“match UK standards”). However, the ability to 
passport has also become linked to overall relations with Spain. An agreement in April 
2000 extended passporting to cover insurance and banking.  
There are many threats to the future of Gibraltar: being part of the EU puts an effective 
lid on its ability to design policies entirely on its own, and relations with Spain, notably 
the forthcoming reunification, may in the long run prevent the solidification of Gibraltar 
as an offshore centre. 
Table 10. Gibraltar’s financial centre 
Population  27,649 
GDP per capita, €  18,940 
Bank deposits, €bn  9.1
a 
Insurance assets, €bn  0.4 
Number of registered offshore companies  8,800
 b 
Number of banks  18 
Employees in offshore sector  2,200 
Contribution of offshore sector to economy, %  25
 c 
a  Offshore business only: €3.2 billion. 
b  Total number of registered companies is 28,500, of which 8,800 are exempt and another 146 
qualifying companies with substantially reduced tax rates. 
 
c  Estimated contribution of financial sector (both on- and offshore) to the economy.
 
Source: Gibraltar Financial Services Commission (2001) and IMF (2001). 
Tax regime 
Gibraltar has no capital gains tax, wealth tax, estate duty, inheritance tax or VAT. The 
normal corporate and personal income tax rate is 35%, the withholding tax is 1%.  
Table 11. Gibraltar’s tax regime 
Personal income tax  50%
a 
Qualifying individuals  £10,000-20,000 
Corporate tax  35% 
Exempt companies  £225 
Qualified companies  0-35% 
Capital gains tax  0 
Inheritance tax  0 
VAT  0 
Withholding tax  1% 
a  At income exceeding £19,500. A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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However, as a non-resident individual or as a company dealing only with non-residents, 
much lower rates apply, as can be seen from the table. Wealthy investors will pay a 
maximum tax of £10,000. Certain companies are eligible for tax exemption and as such 
pay an annual tax of £225. Other companies may apply to fit in under the “qualified 
company” status, which enables them to negotiate a tax rate well below the normal rate, 
normally around 5-10%. 
Financial supervision 
The FSF placed Gibraltar in its second group, meaning those OFCs that have legislation 
and supervisory structures in place, but that fail to implement them. Gibraltar has 
contested this judgement. A closer scrutiny renders some support to its argument.  
The Financial Services Commission (FSC) carries out financial supervision. Since its 
inception in 1989, it has managed to clean up Gibraltar’s financial sector, which was 
tarnished after scandals in the 1980s (e.g. the Barlow Clowes affair). Two facts ensure a 
close link with UK supervision: a) the Governor appoints the Commissioner with 
approval from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and b) the Commission 
has a statutory obligation to establish supervisory practices that match those in the UK. 
The above-mentioned Edwards Review also rendered support to Gibraltar’s level of 
supervision. It highlighted the independent nature of the FSC, its abstinence from any 
marketing role and the absence of governors with a political link. In addition, being part 
of the EU, Gibraltar is obliged to implement all the relevant directives. Gibraltar has a 
deposit and investor protection scheme.  
Money laundering 
Gibraltar has had a stringent money laundering regime in place since the EU money 
laundering directive was transposed in 1995. It has signed up to the FATF and is 
participating in the mutual evaluation process within the structures of the Offshore 
Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). As a consequence, the FATF did not mention 
Gibraltar in its report on non-cooperative jurisdictions. A 2001 IMF assessments 
concluded that a comprehensive regime was in place, but that “as in other jurisdictions, 
there always scope for improving know your customer requirements”.
62 
3.3  Guernsey 
Guernsey is one of the five main islands comprising the Channel Islands, the other four 
being Jersey, Alderney, Sark and Herm. Their existence dates back to 1204, when the 
islands won the right of self-government in return for loyalty to the English Crown. The 
UK is responsible for defence and international relations and ultimately also for the 
good governance of these islands, but it cannot legislate for these islands on tax matters. 
Domestic affairs are handled by the legislatures of the islands. The relations between the 
Channel Islands and Isle of Man are dealt with in Protocol 3 of the UK’s accession 
treaty with the EU. According to this, the Channel Islands are part of the customs 
territory.
63 In other words, they apply the CCT and CAP, but have no free movement of 
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capital, services and persons. As a result, in contrast with Gibraltar, the Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man are not part of the internal market. 
Following high-profile bank scandals in the early 1990s, the UK launched a review of 
their crown dependencies’ financial regulation (the above-mentioned Edwards Review). 
While concluding that these OFCs were in the first division of OFCs, the report 
nevertheless found that financial regulation had to be deepened and that company 
regulation had to  be strengthened. As a consequence, the islands have since been 
engaged in regulatory reform and dialogue with the OECD and the FSF.  
The financial sector accounts for 46% of Guernsey’s economy. The main sectors are 
banking, investment management and insurance. There are 76 banks located in 
Guernsey, possessing deposits worth  €132 billion. They are mostly subsidiaries or 
branches of large parent banks in the UK, the EU, North America, Australia and Asia.
64 
The banks employ 2,700 staff members, which accounts for nearly one-quarter of the 
total workforce.  
Table 12. Guernsey’s financial centre 
Population  58,681 
GDP per capita, €  32,054 
Bank deposits, € billion  132.0 
Funds under management, € billion  48.5 
Insurance assets, € billion  14.4 
Offshore companies  15,453 
Number of banks  76 
Employees in financial sector  6,500 
Share of total employment, %  21 
Contribution of financial sector to the economy, %  46 
The investment business consists of the management, administration and custody of 
collective investment schemes.
65 There are more than 80 groups from nearly 40 
countries that are managing funds. In 2001, Guernsey funds managed assets worth 
€48.5 billion. Guernsey is also a centre for captive insurance. Since its origins in the 
1920s, the number of companies underwriting the insurance risks of other companies 
has grown to over 340. Guernsey has been named as Europe’s biggest domicile for 
offshore insurance. It accounts for €14.4 billion. Guernsey is also an important company 
centre. There are over 130 companies specialised in company and trust administration. 
Consequently, Guernsey is the home of over 15,000 offshore companies.  
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Tax regime 
Guernsey only levies two taxes: income and corporate, both at 20%. There are 
exemptions, however. Exempt companies (i.e. where the beneficial ownership is in the 
hands on non-residents who do not carry out any substantial activity) pay an annual flat 
fee o f £600. International companies (i.e. owned by non-residents and generating 
income exclusively for non-residents) negotiate their tax fee with the authorities. 
Typically the tax is in the range of 0 to 2%.
66 Guernsey has only one double-taxation 
treaty and that is with the UK.  
Table 13. Guernsey’s tax regime 
Income tax  20% 
Corporate taxes  20% 
Exempt companies  £600 
International company  0-30% 
Capital gains tax  0 
Inheritance tax  0 
VAT  0 
Withholding tax  0 
On 21 February 2002, Guernsey signed up to the OECD project. While stressing that it 
already does exchange information for tax purposes, Guernsey undertook to negotiate 
reciprocal information exchange agreements, to ensure that Guernsey authorities have 
access to bank information that is “relevant to tax matters” and force companies to keep 
audited accounts, all this before the end of 2005.
67 Whether to his will affect tax rates 
remains to be seen. 
Financial regulation and supervision 
The Financial Services Commission (FSC) carries out financial supervision. The 
Edwards Review concluded that financial regulation was adequate but that consumer 
protection schemes should be developed. Guernsey is therefore in the process of 
creating a depositor protection scheme, while adapting such a scheme to the island’s 
wealthy and sophisticated investors.
68 The FSF also judged financial regulation, 
supervision and cooperation to be satisfactory and consequently placed the islands in its 
first group.  
Money laundering 
Guernsey has a comprehensive anti-money laundering system. Banks apply a “know-
your-customer” policy. Anonymous bank accounts are not permitted and even though 
there is a significant amount of confidentiality in bank relations, there are legal 
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windows enabling it to be circumscribed in certain situations. In addition, both the 
Edwards Review and the FSF report judged that Guernsey cooperates well with foreign 
authorities.  
3.4   Isle of Man 
The Isle of Man (IoM) is significantly larger than the Channel Islands, thereby easing 
the pressure on property prices. As a consequence, the island has a competitive edge 
over the other dependencies in certain financial services. IoM has the world’s oldest 
parliament, the Tynwald, dating back to the Viking age. It has the same relations with 
the EU as the Channel Islands, but has a customs union with the UK. As a consequence, 
the IoM has the same VAT as the UK, 17.5%.  
The main activities of the financial sector in the Isle of Man are deposit-taking, asset 
protection and management, packaged investments such as unit trusts, life assurance 
and also fiduciary services such as company and trust management. The financial sector 
employs nearly 5,400 people. Another 1,500 are employed in related “professional 
services” (accountants, lawyers, etc.). The financial sector contributed 41% to national 
income in 2001.  
Table 14. Isle of Man’s financial centre 
Population  71,714 
GDP per capita, €  21,383 
Bank deposits, € billion  43.6 
Funds under management, € billion  7.9 
Insurance assets, € billion  29.6 
Offshore companies  41,747 
Number of banks  60 
Employees in financial sector  5,400 
Share of total employment, %  26 
Contribution of offshore sector to 
the economy, % 
41 
Source: Webpages of the Isle of Man Treasury. 
Bank deposits in the Isle of Man amount to €43.6 billion. This is less than both 
Guernsey and Jersey. The Isle of Man is also smaller in managing assets than the two 
Channel Islands. The island is one of the largest offshore centres for insurance. This is 
partly due to specific factors such as space and educated workforce, which well suits the 
relatively more labour-intensive insurance business. The island is also very competitive 
in company administration. Over 40,000 companies are officially registered in the IoM, 
of which around half are exempt or non-resident.  
Tax regime 
Individuals and corporations are subject to income tax. The levels depend on the size of 
the revenue, as can be seen from the table below. As mentioned above, IoM levies A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
39 
VAT. To curb its unequal effect (poor people pay a higher share of their income in 
VAT),  IoM also has a system of allowances that are quite generous (e.g. married 
couples receive an annual allowance of nearly £15,000). IoM has no estate, capital 
gains, capital transfers or wealth taxes. IoM has a double-taxation agreement with the 
UK.  
To meet the concerns of the OECD, the Isle of Man has announced a radical overhaul of 
its tax regime, which would go some way to curb the harmful features identified by the 
OECD. Under the proposals presented by the Minister of the Treasury, approved by the 
Council of Ministers and to be presented to the parliament in October, Isle of Man will 
over the next five years reduce its corporate and income taxes (see table). At the same 
time, it will bring in those exempt companies that have a significant local presence 
under the normal tax regime, albeit at a zero rate. This means that all shipping, 
insurance and fund management business will pay zero tax, no matter whether they are 
residents or not.
69 These changes will be phased in over two years. This meets OECD’s 
concern on ring fencing. The IoM has also announced that they are ready to renegotiate 
their tax agreement with the UK so that information exchange can be ensured. At the 
same time, the IoM has declared that they are open to discuss the continued existence of 
the IBC and exempt categories.  
The Isle of Man decided to cooperate much earlier with the OECD than the Channel 
Islands. Whether this set an example or whether it will work to the Isle of Man’s 
disadvantage (it promised to scrap ring-fencing, which no longer forms part of the 
OECD’s requirements) remains to be seen.  
Table 15. Isle of Man’s tax regime 
Old regime  New regime 
Income tax    Income tax   
Standard rate  14%  Standard rate  10% 
Higher rate  20%  Higher rate  15% 
Non-resident  20%  Non-resident  10% 
Corporate tax    Corporate tax   
Domestic  14-20%  Trading companies  10% 
Exempt  £400  Others  15% 
IBC  0.5-35% (min. £1,200)  Ship, insurance, fund 
management 
0% 
Other    Other   
VAT  17.5%  VAT  17.5% 
Source: Webpages of Isle of Man Treasury. 
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Financial regulation and supervision 
The Financial Services Commission was established in 1983. Since its inception it has 
corrected the initial flaws of unsupervised deregulation that characterised the early 
1980s. Today, the Isle of Man’s financial regulation is regarded as transparent and 
efficient. Strong licensing tests, a separate enforcement division and depositor and 
investor protection provide stability to its financial centre. In addition, its financial 
authorities work closely and share information with regulators from other countries.
70 
The FSF accordingly placed IoM in its first group.  
Money laundering 
IoM financial institutions apply “know-your-customer” principles. The FATF has 
judged that IoM has all the relevant regulations in place.  
3.5  Jersey 
Jersey is the largest of the Channel Islands. It has the same relations with the UK and 
the EU as Guernsey. Jersey is first and foremost an international banking centre, with 
nearly 80 banks, from 17 countries accounting for total deposits of nearly €212 billion. 
There are nearly 90 fund management houses handling assets worth  €156 billion. 
Moreover, Jersey is the home to over 35,000 offshore companies. On the other hand, 
Jersey has a relatively small insurance industry (€9 million). However, the island is 
working hard to acquire a larger share of the insurance industry, as is witnessed by the 
1996 Insurance Law. Overall, the financial sector employs 7,600 people. 
Table 16. Jersey’s financial centre  
Population  85,200 
GDP per capita, €  26,000 
Bank deposits, € billion  211.9 
Funds under management, € billion  155.7 
Insurance assets, € billion  0.9 
Offshore companies  35,000 
Number of banks  70 
Employees in financial sector  7,600 
Share of total employment, %  n.a. 
Contribution of offshore sector to the 
economy, % 
55 
Source: Webpages of Financial Services Commission (2001). 
Since the 1980s, Jersey has been the prime location for special purpose vehicles in 
asset-backed securitisation transactions.
71 The reasons for this success are not only 
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beneficial tax levels, but also the presence of major accountancy firms, international 
banks and large commercial law firms. 
Tax regime 
Jersey has no capital or wealth taxes. Personal income is taxed at 20%. Exempt 
companies (see Guernsey for definition) pay an annual fee of £600. International 
business companies (IBCs) (insurance companies allowed) pay taxes on their profits 
(maximum 2%) and 30% on their “other income”. The exact distribution between 
profits and other income is determined in discussions with the Comptroller of Income 
Tax.  
Table 17. Jersey’s tax regime 
Personal income tax  20% 
Exempt company  £600 
IBCs   
Profits  < 2% 
Other income  30% 
Financial regulation and supervision 
The Financial Stability Forum placed Jersey in its first group, i.e. countries that 
cooperate, have high quality supervision and that adhere to international standards. This 
endorses the efforts that Jersey has taken to implement the remarks in the Edward 
Review, e.g. the enactment of a new regulatory regime for trusts and companies and the 
creation of a more independent Financial Services Commission.  
In addition, Jersey is in the process of enacting new powers to improve its international 
cooperation and to impose a new depositor protection scheme. Jersey was well 
regulated even before the Edwards Review. BCCI, the bank that spectacularly went bust 
in the early 1990s and that triggered a debate on supervisory cross-border cooperation, 
twice applied for establishment in Jersey. It was turned down both times.  
Money laundering 
Jersey has a comprehensive “all crimes” anti-money laundering legislation in place 
since 1999. The FATF judged Jersey to be cooperative, but expressed the same 
concerns as for Guernsey. The US Department of State has classified Jersey as of 
“primary concern”, but this is only because of the size of its financial sector and its 
proximity to major business centres. The same report stated that Jersey has “clearly 
demonstrated the political will to ensure that its financial institutions and services 
industry is not used to launder money.”
72 
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3.6  Liechtenstein 
Liechtenstein is famous for its strict banking secrecy and the wide range of offshore 
vehicles an investor can choose from. In 2000, the Principality achieved the not-so-
envious feat of figuring on all three blacklists (FATF, FSF and OECD).  
Liechtenstein is a constitutional hereditary monarchy. The Prince represents the 
Principality abroad, signs all laws, appoints the government and passes judgement on 
proposals from the parliament. A 25-seat parliament is responsible for legislation. It has 
a long-standing customs union with Switzerland. Since the beginning of 1990s, the 
Prince has anchored the Principality more firmly into the international community: 
Liechtenstein joined the United Nations in 1990 and the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. Liechtenstein has a 
diversified economy, which is performing well. Its economic success rewards 
Liechtenstein with one of the highest GDPs per capita in the world, €54,000.
73  
Table 18. Liechtenstein’s financial centre 
Population  32,491 
GDP per capita, €  53,570 
Bank deposits, € billion  19.3 
Funds under management, € billion  80.9 
Insurance assets, € billion  0.2 
Offshore companies  80,000 
Number of banks  17 
Employees in financial sector  1,400 
Share of total employment, %  n.a. 
Contribution of offshore sector to the economy, %  23 
Sources: Standard & Poor’s (2001) and Liechtenstein government. 
Liechtenstein is the home to a large financial sector. The financial sector employs over 
1,400 persons. The main services r elate to private banking, fund management and 
company and trust management. 
The banking sector is dominated by private banking directed to wealthy investors. It 
was opened up to foreign competition in 1992. Today, there are 17 banks with deposits 
worth €19.3 billion. Funds under management amount to €80.9 billion. The insurance 
sector is quite limited, estimated at €200 million. 
Offshore vehicles 
There are five different types of companies: 
•  Foundation. Assets set aside and dedicated to a specific purpose. Beneficial 
ownership is strictly confidential. Ideal for inheritance planning. 
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•  Establishment. Unique to Liechtenstein. Special purpose company with the right to 
carry out commercial activity. Independent legal personality. Capital need not be 
divided into shares. More flexible than Plc.  
•  Trust. Unique in continental Europe. More flexible than its common law equivalent.  
•  Trust enterprise. Typically a legal entity with own assets. Trustor transfers assets to 
the company and specifies the purpose.  
•  Public limited company. Resembles the Plc in most European countries.  
In total, Liechtenstein is the home to 80,000 companies.
74 
Tax regime 
An outline of Liechtenstein’s tax regime can be found below. Liechtenstein has a tax 
system that resembles many OECD countries in the sense that it taxes many bases 
(private income, corporate income, capital etc.). This is a reflection that Liechtenstein, 
compared to many other OFCs, has a solid “state” foundation. The difference is that the 
rates are lower, especially for offshore businesses. 
Tax evasion normally falls under administrative law, i.e. it is not judicially punishable. 
In certain cases (so-called “qualified tax evasion”), tax evasion becomes a criminal 
offence (e.g. if documents are falsified). Supervisors do not disclose information for tax 
reasons to other countries. Liechtenstein is currently negotiating with the OECD. 
Table 19. Liechtenstein’s tax regime 
Personal taxes    Coupon Tax   
Wealth tax  1.8‰ - 8.91‰% Legal entities, bonds, investment 
funds units etc. 
4% 
Income tax  3.6% - 18.6%  Foreign insurance companies   
Corporate Taxes    Premium income (life, annuities)  1% 
Organisation tax  3‰ / 2‰  Other types premium income  2% 
Capital tax  2‰  Investment funds   
Earnings tax  7.5% - 20%  Stamp duty  2% 
Special Corporate Taxes    Transfer stamp tax  0.15% - 0.3% 
Tax on capital and reserves of 
domiciliary and holding 
companies 
1‰  Capital and income tax  4‰ - 15‰ 
Source: Presse und Informationsamt, 2002. 
Financial regulation and supervision 
The FSF placed Liechtenstein in its third group, i.e. countries not cooperating, not 
devoting sufficient resources to supervision and not adhering to international standards. 
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As a result, Liechtenstein has since increased the resources of the Financial Services 
Authority (AFD), which is responsible for carrying out supervision, notably in numbers 
of staff. 
Money laundering 
In 1998, the German Secret Service (BND) accused the Principality of being a major 
centre for international money laundering. A French parliamentary report in 2000 
launched similar accusations.
75 In June 2000, the FATF placed Liechtenstein on its 
blacklist, the only European OFC to suffer this reproach. 
The problem with Liechtenstein according to these reports was not that the Principality 
did not have laws in place. On the contrary, since the mid-1990s, Liechtenstein had 
adopted a Due Diligence Act and a law on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters. Moreover, money laundering had been made a criminal offence in the Criminal 
Code. The problem rather was a lack of enforcement of these laws. For example, the 
Council of Europe’s select committee judged that the system needed to be improved 
both on the “preventive and repressive side”.
76  
Following Liechtenstein’s  annus  horribilis, the Principality has acted resolutely to 
address the problems while not touching its cherished bank secrecy
77:  
•  In July 2000, Liechtenstein’s Banking Association strengthened  know-your-
customer (KYC) rules. As a result, the practice whereby banks in some cases only 
knew the identity of a beneficial owner via an intermediary (e.g. lawyer) was 
abolished. In November 2001, Liechtenstein’s government decided to freeze the 
accounts where banks had not been able to identify the beneficial owner.   
•  The law on mutual assistance was changed in November 2000, in order to make the 
procedure faster and more efficient.  
•  On money laundering, an updated Criminal Code entered into force in December 
2000. There, the predicate offences have been extended to cover “misdemeanours in 
relation to corruption offences” and own-funds laundering. The knowledge 
requirement has been replaced with “intent”, which makes it much easier for 
prosecutors to prove that laundering has taken place.  
•  An amended Due Diligence Act came into force in January 2001. Its applicability 
has been extended to money exchange bureaus and to persons engaged in “trust-like 
operations”. This ensures that all persons who accept or keep in custody other 
persons’ assets, or help to invest or to transfer them, will be subject to the act. 
Provisions regarding origins of funds have been extended, requiring the 
establishment of the origin and economic background of funds as well as the 
purpose of the transaction. If there is suspicion of money laundering, institutions 
have an obligation to clarify the situation. If suspicions remain, institutions have an 
obligation to report their findings. Institutions will also have to prove that they have 
lived up to their due diligence obligations, not only to show that they have proper 
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procedures in place. The new act also imposes an internal and external cooperation 
regulation. Internally, all authorities are obliged to cooperate. Externally, the 
regulation makes cooperation with  foreign Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) 
easier.  
•  The government established a separate  Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 
February 2001. The main task of the FIU is to receive, evaluate and analyse the 
suspicious activity reports received from financial intermediaries. If money 
laundering is detected, the case is forwarded to the public prosecutor’s office. The 
FIU is allowed to cooperate with foreign FIUs.  
•  Generally, the  regulatory and supervisory resources have been expanded. More 
judges have been employed, the number of staff in the Prosecutor’s office dealing 
with financial crime has doubled. The AFD created a new division on “Duties of 
due diligence/compliance” and a new economic crime unit under the police has been 
set up (EWOK).  
One sign that the new system appears effective is the number of suspicious transactions 
reported to the FIU. In 2001, the FIU received 158 reports, mostly related to suspicion 
of fraud (38%) or money laundering (31%). Of these, financial intermediaries 
themselves (banks, fiduciaries, lawyers, etc.) reported 64 cases reflecting suspicions 
arising during their due diligence process. An equal number came from law authorities, 
which took action in response to requests for mutual assistance. Finally, 30 reports were 
filed in conjunction with a domestic court action. There was a clear trend over the year 
of an increased incidence of reporting by financial intermediaries to the FIU, reflecting 
an increase in awareness of the problem. Of the 158 reported suspicions, 121 were 
forwarded to the Prosecutor’s office.
78  
As a result of all these changes, the FATF removed Liechtenstein from its blacklist in 
June 2001.  
3.7  Madeira 
Madeira’s international business centre (MIBC) dates back to the mid-1980s. The 
MIBC is a particular case, as the Madeiran islands are integral parts of Portugal and 
thus the EU. As a consequence, Madeira does not have full liberty in setting its tax 
rates, supervisory arrangements and regulation. The European Commission’s explicit, 
albeit conditional, approval explains nevertheless that Madeira has been able to create 
an offshore centre.  
Portugal and Madeira were motivated to set up an offshore centre by a desire to 
stimulate economic development. Madeira is one of the poorest parts of Portugal, with a 
local GDP per capita amounting to only 46% of the EU’s average. 
The MIBC consists of four sectors: the industrial free trade zone, the financial sector, 
the “international services” sector (consultancy, legal advice, management…) and a 
shipping register. As can be seen from the table, the financial part of the MIBC appears 
to be small compared to the major European OFCs. As only limited data are available, 
however, there is still a considerable margin of uncertainty.  
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Box 6. Fiscal incentives in the Canary Islands 
Another example of OFC activities taking place within the EU is the advantageous economic 
regimes being accorded to the Canary Islands. Although these incentives are in accordance with 
EU law, notably due to being limited in time and proportional to the tax loss incurred, they 
fundamentally apply the same instruments of competition as offshore centres in order to attract 
economic activity: low taxes. The main difference is that mobile financial services are excluded 
from these activities. Nevertheless, other lucrative services (e.g. tax consultancy) remains 
eligible. 
The general Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) was set up in 1972.
a A general 
strand is that the REF employs a number of instruments, involving both direct and indirect taxes 
and modifying both the tax rate and the tax base.  
Apart from the general regime, after approval of the European Commission in January 2000 the 
Canary Islands benefit from the Canary Islands Special Zone (ZEC) regime. The ZEC will 
initially apply until 31 December 2008, with company registrations ending in December 2006. 
However, the Commission may extend these limits. The ZEC covers both service activities, 
which may locate freely in the Canary Islands, as well as industrial activities, which may locate 
in designated areas close to ports and airports on the various islands.  
The ZEC imposes  requirements that a company must fulfil in order to qualify for its tax 
benefits: one of the managers must be a resident of the Canary Islands, the company must make 
an investment of at least €100.000 in fixed assets within the first two years, it must create at 
least five jobs within six months and maintain these five jobs during its time as a ZEC entity. 
Finally, it is only allowed to engage in certain activities. Notably, financial services, intragroup 
services and coordination centres are excluded. However, the scope of activities is wide, 
covering everything from manufacturing (e.g. food, machinery and chemicals) to services (e.g. 
telecommunications, tax consultancy, auditing, consultancy and holding).  
ZEC companies enjoy substantial additional tax benefits. First, on part of their corporate income 
tax base they pay a tax of between 1-5%. The extent of this tax base exemption and the rate 
depends on number of jobs created, type of economic activity and timing of establishment. 
Second, as the Canary Islands are an integral part of the EU, ZEC companies benefit from 
Spain’s double taxation agreements and the EU parent-subsidiary directive. No withholding 
taxes are thus levied on profits repatriated from a ZEC subsidiary to its parent company. Many 
of these benefits apply to non-EU residents as well. Finally, ZEC companies are exempt from 
stamp duty in many cases. These tax benefits apply differentially depending on economic 
activity. Activities that are likely to contribute more to the local economy (e.g. in terms of 
employment and investments) receive larger tax benefits. Activities with low local contribution 
receive lower tax benefits.  
Overall, Spanish authorities have estimated that the ZEC will cover 563 firms, employing 
roughly 2.800 persons. This would lead to a net tax loss of €102 million (lost tax receipts – 
fees). The factors listed above (handicap, proportionality, degressiveness, time limit) led the 
European Commission to endorse the scheme.  
Sources: Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime Act; Law 30/1972, Royal Decree Law 13/1996; 
Royal Decree Law 7/1998; COM (2000) 891; COM (2001) 732; European Commission, Aide 
d’état no. 708/98; Hager and Levin, 2002. A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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Table 20. Madeira’s financial centre 
Population  261,800 
GDP per capita, €  9,145 
Bank deposits, € billion
a  2.9 
Funds under management, € billion  n.a. 
Insurance assets, € billion  n.a. 
Offshore companies  5,931 
Number of banks (incl. branches)  41 
Employees in offshore sector  3,729 
Share of total employment  3 
a Deposits held offshore by emigrants in the MIBC in 1997. This excludes deposits held by other non-
residents, e.g. from the EU. Therefore, the real number is larger. Most of the banking entities in the MIBC 
are external branches, and therefore they consolidate deposits at Head Office level. 
Source: SDM; Madeira regional government and Portuguese government.  
Tax regime 
Companies in the MIBC currently pay no corporate taxes. As can be seen from the table 
below, employees pay normal personal income taxes and VAT is at 17.5%, which is 
high by offshore standards.  
Table 21. Madeira’s tax regime 
Direct taxes   
Corporate tax  0% - 12.5% 
Personal income tax  14% - 40% 
Indirect taxes   
VAT  17% 
Withholding tax  0% 
Stamp duty  0% 
Excise taxes  0% (industry zone) 
Madeira is an interesting OFC in the sense that its tax incentives have to be approved by 
the European Commission under state aid rules. The EC Treaty prohibits state aid in any 
form under normal circumstances (see Box 5). Under certain circumstances, however, 
certain state aid measures are allowed including state aid to the so-called outermost 
regions of the EU, of which Madeira forms part. 
Nevertheless, even though outermost regions may receive state aid, such aid is subject 
to regular evaluation. The MIBC tax measures are currently scrutinised by the European 
Commission as part of a regular revaluation of the MIBC scheme. Madeira’s ability to 
authorise new institutions to register under the MIBC has not been renewed yet by the MATTIAS LEVIN 
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Commission. Therefore, Madeira is currently unable to accept new entrants to its 
MIBC. The MIBC has also been scrutinised under the EU’s Code of Conduct. Despite 
reservations from the Portuguese delegation, the Code of Conduct group included the 
tax measures applying to the financial sector in its list of 66 harmful measures (B006).
79  
Financial regulation and supervision 
Madeira is unusual in another sense as well. Being an integral part of Portugal, 
supervision is carried out by the Bank of Portugal, the country’s central bank. EU 
financial legislation applies to Madeira as well. Therefore, the EU’s recently updated 
money laundering directive will also apply in Madeira. Furthermore, being part of 
Portugal also means benefiting from Portugal’s vast array of double tax treaties 
(currently 20). Since 2001, Portugal, and thus Madeira, has abolished bank secrecy. 
Portugal has also signed up for the draft directive on savings taxation, which envisages 
automatic information exchange for tax purposes.  
To sum up, Madeira is not a typical OFC. While having a comparative tax advantage, 
these taxes are limited in time (2011) and subject to revaluation by the EU and are 
therefore not a permanent arrangement. Moreover, regulation and supervision match 
onshore standards. It is therefore likely that Madeira, being part of the EU, will find it 
difficult to sustain its offshore business centre by means that are inconsistent with EU 
norms.  
3.8  Monaco 
The Principality of Monaco, a constitutional monarchy, is primarily a locus for private 
banking. Monaco offers offshore financial services to individuals and firms of all 
nationalities except French. Monaco has a customs and monetary union with France. It 
is not part of the EU, except for VAT purposes. While private banking was the driving 
force behind Monaco’s establishment as an OFC, the Principality has recently 
developed other activities, e.g. real estate banking, corporate lending, interbank and 
shipping-operations.  
Table 22. Monaco’s financial centre 
Population  29,972 
GDP per capita, €  27,000 
Bank deposits, € billion  43.3 
Funds under management, € billion  39.6 
Insurance assets, € billion  n.a. 
Offshore companies  n.a. 
Number of banks  40 
Employees in financial sector  1,700 
Share of total employment, %  5.6 
Contribution of offshore sector to the economy, %  50 
Source: Monaco sur le web (http://www.monte-carlo.mc/invest/index.html#fiscal). 
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Offshore companies 
There are five different forms of companies: i ndividual enterprises, partnerships, 
companies, other collective commercial bodies, bureaux administratif and agencies. The 
law prohibits pure holding companies. Only residents can form trusts, but it is easy to 
transfer trusts formed elsewhere. No official number exists, but it has been estimated 
that there are roughly as many offshore companies as there are inhabitants.  
Tax regime 
As can be seen from the table, Monaco levies no income tax on individuals and very 
few other taxes. Tax evasion is not a crime. Due to a tax agreement with France, French 
citizens are not eligible for these advantageous rates, but instead pay French taxes.  The 
rates for corporations are interesting as well. The same tax rate applies to all kinds of 
offshore companies. Monaco has not reacted to its inclusion on the OECD list. 
Table 23. Monaco’s tax regime 
Corporate taxation   
Business income tax (locals)  0% 
Business income tax  
(if more than 25% of sales are generated outside Monaco) 
33.33% 
Natural persons (except French nationals)   
Income tax  0 
Inheritance tax  0 
VAT  5.5% - 17.5% 
Financial regulation and supervision 
The FSF placed Monaco in its second group. Therefore, the IMF will soon contact it, as 
the FSF recommended the Fund to concentrate on group II jurisdictions. French banking 
law applies in Monaco. The French Banking Commission supervises the banking sector. 
Monaco has not adhered to the European Convention on Judicial Cooperation in Penal 
Matters. The country currently has 12 bilateral cooperation treaties. Historically it has 
been difficult to obtain cooperation with Monegasque authorities. 
Money laundering 
Money laundering is a criminal offence in Monaco. The main problems relate to the 
presence of many casinos. The FATF judged that the Principality has comprehensive 
legislation in place, but that the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) lacks resources to 
properly combat financial crime. This contrasts with a French parliamentary report last 
year that came to a different conclusion, claiming that Monaco’s banking secrecy, lax 
supervision and insufficient international cooperation made the country vulnerable to 
money laundering.
80 
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3.9  “Legitimate” OFCs 
The term offshore centre, which historically has had an image of exoticism and 
adventure, has increasingly become laden with a negative connotation. The processes 
outlined above can partly be seen as a rational response aimed at eliminating money 
laundering and reducing harmful tax competition. It is not surprising, however, that 
these processes are primarily pushed by onshore countries whose commercial centre 
actors have a self-interest in reducing the competition they face. Therefore, the power to 
designate what constitutes an on- and offshore centre is vital. In that respect, it should 
be remembered that several, if not  most onshore financial centres share some of the 
characteristics of an OFC. Some of these are outlined below. 
Dublin 
Sometimes, the establishment of an offshore centre is regarded as a development 
strategy. By creating a zone where taxes are lower and regulation less burdensome, a 
jurisdiction is able to attract business that it would otherwise forego, whose benefits 
may spread to the onshore economy. 
This was the reasoning behind the Irish government’s decision in 1987 to set up the 
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. Financial services were 
growing fast around the world and the government thought that Ireland, with its 
abundant supply of well educated but cheap labour, would be able to gain a share of the 
location of these services.  
The centre has proven to be a success. It today employs nearly 4,000 people and over 
400 financial institutions are operating directly from Dublin. It has gained a particular 
foothold in fund management as well as a substantial share in international banking, 
corporate treasury and some insurance activities. The main explanation for the success 
is low taxes. Corporation tax for firms located in the IFSC is 10%, far below the EU 
average of 37%. Dublin therefore is just as much a tax haven as, say, the Channel 
Islands.  
The difference is that the Irish government sought, and got, permission from the other 
members of the EU before embarking on the road of tax competition. The European 
Commission regarded it as a development strategy and also saw the instrument, low 
taxes, as proportionate to the harm done. However, one requirement was that the IFSC 
had to be dismantled once its aims were achieved. That is exactly what has happened. In 
December 1999, a replacement scheme was developed, in which a new corporate 
income tax rate of 12.5% will apply from 1 January 2003. For firms already registered 
in the IFSC, the new tax rate will be phased in between 2005 (IFSC, Shannon) and 2010 
(manufacturing, certain internationally traded services)
 (see www.ifsc.ie).
 
The new rate is still far below the EU average and brings some understandable 
resentment among OFCs. Why should they comply with the OECD’s and the EU’s 
claims if the EU lets one of its own members maintain harmful tax measures?  A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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The City of London
81 
One of the first offshore markets was the eurodollar market. The eurodollar market was 
the first step towards the demise of the Bretton Woods system (operational from 1958 to 
1971), where international capital flows were tightly regulated, and a return to a system 
of liberalised capital flows which was the rule under the gold standard. 
The eurodollar market originated in the 1940s and 1950s when the Soviet Union and 
China decided to deposit their dollar holdings in Paris and London, as they feared that 
these revenues might otherwise be frozen (as the US had done with Yugoslavia’s gold 
held in New York). One of the banks chosen for this purpose, Banque Commerciale 
pour l’Europe du Nord, had the telex address EURBANK; thus the term eurodollars.  
This process soon spread to other market operators as well, who discovered that by 
placing their deposits in London they could avoiding exchange control regulations and 
benefit from interest rate arbitrage (avoiding the US regulation Q, which set a ceiling on 
interest paid by banks on their deposits and avoiding minimum reserve requirements). 
An additional boost was that the US ran continuous balance-of-payment deficits, which 
increased the amount of credit flowing from the US to other countries. As m ore and 
more banks participated, this led to the creation of a liquid international money market. 
This market was offshore in the sense that the vehicle used was US dollars, but the 
marketplace was the City of London and the participants were of all nationalities. 
The advent of the eurodollar market is also a tale of how the establishment of an 
offshore market can affect financial power and standing. The Bank of England and the 
City tacitly encouraged the eurodollar market. The City’s fortunes had until World War 
II been tightly connected to sterling. Sterling’s role as an international reserve and 
trading currency gave a dominant role to the City.  With the weakness of sterling after 
the war, the City was prevented from resuming its previous role as the world’s major 
financial centre. By nurturing the creation of a eurodollar market in the City, the Bank 
of England created a new lucrative business line. Although this weakened the position 
of sterling to the benefit of the dollar, it strengthened the position of the City compared 
to New York. 
At the end of the 1950s, demand for US products started to decline. The short-term 
eurodollar market then expanded into longer-term instruments with the advent of 
certificates of deposits and eurobonds. Eurobonds are international bonds issued by a 
syndicate of securities houses in any international currency and placed in more than one 
country.  
An important characteristic of the eurobond market is the non-application of 
withholding taxes. Under the EU’s draft savings taxation directive, the eurobonds 
already in circulation before 1 March 2001, will continue to benefit from this provision 
under a grandfather clause until 2009 (see Ecofin Council Conclusions, 27 November 
2000, and Draft Council Directive, COM(2001)400 of 18 July 2001). Most trading in 
eurobonds is currently taking place in London – and to a large extent, over-the-counter 
(OTC). Euroclear and Clearstream (formerly Cedel) have been the main clearing and 
settlement houses for eurobonds ever since their inception.  
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Luxembourg  
Luxembourg has been at the centre of attention since the attacks on OFCs started in the 
spring of 2000. A member of the EU and the OECD, the country carries out those same 
practices with the same methods that are being singled out by these two organisations as 
unacceptable. For many OFCs, this highlights the hypocritical nature of the attacks.  
Luxembourg’s financial sector dates back to the 1960s. It initially focused on the euro 
credit market, but when this crashed in the 1980s, the financial sector turned towards 
offshore private banking. In the late 1980s, the government introduced tax breaks and 
favourable legislation in order to stimulate the development of investment management. 
Luxembourg today is therefore the home of a disproportionately large financial sector, 
especially concentrated on fund management where it ranks third in the world, only by 
the US and France, and private banking. Net assets amounted to €780 billion in March 
2000. The banking sector is more limited (€208 billion) and the insurance industry 
remains small compared to other centres (see Financial Times, 2000 and CEPROS, 
1999).  
While nominal corporation tax in Luxembourg is high (37.45%), effective rates are 
often lower due to favourable reductions and exemptions. More importantly, 
Luxembourg applies no withholding tax and applies a policy of strict banking secrecy. 
Consequently, Luxembourg is opposed to the OECD initiative on harmful tax 
competition. When the OECD started its process in 1998, Luxembourg did not sign the 
report and did not consider itself bound by the OECD’s recommendations. Luxembourg 
has also resisted efforts by the EU’s Code of Conduct Group on business taxation to 
phase out measures that affect, or may affect, in a significant way the location of 
business activity in the Community.  
Things are about to change however. In December 1999, the Code of Conduct Group 
released a report on harmful tax measures in the EU. It singled out a number of 
preferential regimes in Luxembourg that have to be dismantled, among them 
preferential tax benefits accorded to collective investment undertakings, venture capital 
funds and holding companies. Moreover, at the Feira European Council in March 2000, 
Luxembourg finally caved in on establishing information exchange as the basis for 
taxation on savings. It did so provided that Europe’s offshore centres and key third 
countries abide to the provisions as well. Although this is highly questionable at this 
stage (March 2002), the formal agreement to apply information exchange at some future 
stage marks a turning point in Luxembourg’s position.  
This is further reflected by Luxembourg’s decision to abide by a request by the United 
States to act on behalf of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to collect taxes from 
clients who are American citizens. The IRS has pressured foreign banks to perform 
these tasks and to become “qualified intermediaries” or face the threat of being 
excluded from the US market. Since 1 January 2001, therefore, Luxembourg has 
withheld taxes on investment income earned by US citizens and transferred these funds 
to the IRS.  
It is uncertain how far-reaching the effects will be on bank secrecy. Under the 
agreement with the US, Luxembourg authorities will not disclose the identity of account 
holders to the IRS, thus maintaining secrecy. However, US citizens will not be allowed 
to hold US bonds or equities in Luxembourg unless they are ready to have their identity A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN OFCS 
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revealed to the IRS. In any case, it is likely that the EU will exploit Luxembourg’s 
decision to exchange information with the US in order to push the Grand Duchy into 
implementing the Feira agreement.  
So is Luxembourg an OFC? Despite its size and increasing diversification, Luxembourg 
is still to a large extent an offshore centre. Once again, however, the discussion of 
whether Luxembourg is or is not an OFC reflects the muddled definition of offshore 
centres.  
Switzerland 
Is Switzerland an offshore centre? Some would answer yes. Swiss banks undoubtedly 
provide services mainly to non-residents. Moreover, the FSF included Switzerland in its 
list of OFCs posing a potential risk to the world’s financial system, albeit in the least 
dangerous group.  
Others would answer no. Switzerland is well supervised, well regulated and cooperates 
fully with other jurisdictions. For example, Switzerland has established a strong track 
record of exposing its own banks if they behave badly, as illustrated by the Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission’s (CFB) investigation into dirty money related to the late 
Nigerian dictator Abacha, and of imposing sanctions on foreign banks with branches or 
subsidiaries if they do not follow the rules, as illustrated by investigations into the 
holdings of Vladimiro Montesinos where the General Manager of Bank Leumi le-Israel 
was forced to resign.
82* 
Switzerland can also argue that it does not fit the OECD’s description of a tax haven. Its 
taxes on business and investment income are close to the OECD average. In addition, it 
applies a withholding tax of 35% to all interest and dividend payments of Swiss issuers 
or debtors (irrespective of the domicile). Moreover, Switzerland does not apply ”ring-
fencing”, i.e. a special advantageous regime for offshore non-resident companies.  
Another reason for not including Switzerland is its size. Switzerland is  more of a 
regional financial centre, i.e. it is a large international centre, with deep and liquid 
markets with diverse sources and uses of funds, with advanced payments and 
settlements systems, which provide a full range of financial services to its domestic 
economy and beyond. There are 372 banks in Switzerland employing nearly 120,000 
people. Funds under management in Switzerland amounts to €1,300 billion. (see the 
Financial Times Survey on Switzerland, 2000 and Swiss Bankers Association, 1999). 
Moreover, the financial sector, despite its size, does not account for more than 9% of 
GDP. This is more than other large financial centres such as the UK (7%), but far less 
than the OFCs surveyed in this paper.  
Consequently, the issues at stake for Switzerland are different from those of the OFCs 
in this paper. Switzerland has a functioning regulatory and supervisory machinery in 
place. It has a very broad anti-money laundering regime, which is strictly enforced. 
Despite its bank secrecy, Switzerland is increasingly cooperating with foreign 
authorities. 
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Nevertheless, despite recent regulatory improvements and broadening of financial 
activity, Switzerland is still to a large extent competing in the same market as other 
OFCs: attracting the savings of non-resident, high net-worth individuals. The big Swiss 
banks definitely do provide offshore services. And, despite what is mentioned above, 
there are ways of escaping the withholding tax (e.g. fiduciary deposits). Most 
importantly from a EU-perspective, Swiss authorities do not assist foreign authorities in 
tracking down tax evaders, as tax evasion is not an offence under Swiss law.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROSPECTS FOR OFCS 
he environment for offshore centres is increasingly harsh. Over the last decade 
onshore governments  have pursued  domestic economic reforms  that have 
liberalised their economies and they are thus catching up with OFCs. In addition, 
governments are increasingly cooperating in order to create new structures of 
international governance. Refining rules and institutions so that the international 
financial system remains stable, chasing down the darker side of free capital movements 
and putting limits on what is acceptable tax competition between sovereign states are all 
areas where new forms of governance are emerging.  
4.1  A deteriorating outlook 
The traditional comparative advantages of OFCs have been low taxes, less burdensome 
regulation and secrecy. All these advantages are now being undermined by international 
action:  
•  Regulation. Following increasing compliance with FSF and FATF demands, the 
general level of regulation in OFCs is increasing. OFCs therefore find it harder to 
compete with less burdensome regulation.  
•  Taxation. Low taxes are still OFCs’ major point of attraction. The EU’s and 
OECD’s attempts to curb these tax advantages have been marred by problems. The 
events of 11 September, however, appear to have convinced many OFCs to 
cooperate with the OECD. This should provide some momentum to the EU’s project 
on taxing savings income, although the EU-project is more far-reaching (as it 
attempts to establish automatic information exchange).  
•  Bank secrecy. The preservation of bank secrecy is a common interest between some 
OFCs and some onshore states. Since September 11
th, however, bank secrecy has 
been in the spotlight as financial intelligence units all over the world have gone on 
“fishing expeditions”, i.e. looking for suspect transactions. Bank secrecy makes this 
more difficult. Whether bank secrecy can be reconciled with the increased need for 
financial intelligence remains to be seen. 
As a result, OFCs traditional comparative advantages are being eroded, although there 
are some forces that mitigate these trends: 
•  Taxation goes to the heart of sovereignty. Most states are reluctant to concede any 
of this sovereignty. It is therefore problematic to use power to bring OFCs within 
the fold. The proposition that tax sovereignty is a core part of national sovereignty 
resonates profoundly within most states.  
•  To force OFCs into the fold regarding taxes would require a firm international 
regime. Such a regime, albeit entirely plausible, would be difficult to set up, and to 
sustain over time. Difficulties increase with the number of actors and the complexity 
of the issue and if the costs and benefits are unevenly divided. International action 
on OFCs is a case in point.  
TMATTIAS LEVIN 
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•  While the competition for the location of financial activity increases, the number 
and kind of services susceptible to be carried out in remote locations have increased. 
This trend is likely to continue. 
4.2  Policy recommendations 
OFCs have to change 
The challenge for OFCs is to develop business lines that are less dependent upon 
secrecy and tax and regulatory advantages. OFCs ought to react pro-actively by thinking 
strategically about which industries and which activities they should foster and attract. 
OFCs should aim at increasing their reputation by bringing themselves into line with 
emerging international norms while keeping some of their traditional advantages. 
Table 24. Strategies for adapting to a harsh environment 
Time frame  Aim  Measures 
Short term  Show that OFC does not harbour 
criminal money launderers 
Comply with FATF 
•  Strict know-your-customer rules 
•  Stringent and comprehensive regulation 
•  Effective implementation 
•  Tough supervision and enforcement 
•  Follow Swiss example of naming and 
shaming publicly 
Start process of cooperation with OECD 
Start self-assessment on terrorism financing 
Medium term  Adjust functioning of tax system in 
order to comply with OECD 
requests before 2005 
End opaque tax practices 
Make sure bank secrecy provisions are 
compatible with specific information 
exchange requirements 
Concentrate efforts on confidentiality 
standards of information exchange 
agreements 
Argue strongly for tax sovereignty in 
international arena 
Long term  Widen business base  Widen scope of services 
Develop other comparative advantages: not 
build industry entirely on tax/regulatory 
advantages 
Attract key skills/people 
In the short term:  
•  OFCs should ensure that they are not placed on the FATF’s blacklist. This will 
mean fulfilling the FATF recommendations and in particular, blocking the accounts 
where beneficial owners have not been identified.  THE PROSPECTS FOR OFCS 
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•  OFCs should continue the cooperative stance in the new screening exercise of the 
FATF on terrorism financing that is due to start in June 2002.  
•  OFCs should improve the standing and status of their supervisory authorities. 
Increasing their regulatory powers or increasing their numbers could achieve this 
aim for example.  
•  OFCs also ought to name and shame individuals or companies that breach money 
laundering or other financial rules. Switzerland is a good example, where this 
practice has had the spin-off effect of improving the image of the Swiss financial 
centre.  
•  Bearing in mind that bank secrecy is of instrumental importance, OFCs have to 
show in practice that it does not make it more difficult to find financial criminals, 
whether they have terrorist links or not.  
•  OFCs should increase the resources devoted to financial supervision in order to 
match the significant size of their financial sectors. The argument that OFCs face 
insurmountable obstacles due to the limited size of their work force rings hollow. 
By attracting a sizeable and lucrative chunk of international capital, it is the duty of 
OFCs to ensure that this capital is clean and poses no risk to the international 
financial system.  
•  In addition, professional quality should be underscored by promoting self-regulation 
among the different professions involved in OFCs. They should set codes promoting 
high levels of integrity in day-to-day business. Since OFCs are generally small, 
these should not be too difficult to implement. 
•  OFCs should engage constructively with the OECD, provided that a true level 
playing field is established. That would require OECD members (e.g. Switzerland 
and Luxembourg) to accelerate the dismantling of their harmful tax measures. 
•  There is a widespread lack of information about offshore centres. To a large extent 
this is inherent in the very concept of offshore as a place where financial capital can 
be quietly deposited. Many OFCs have, however, much higher standards of 
supervision, disclosure, etc., than commonly thought. They ought to communicate 
that fact more effectively to the outside world. One way would be to improve their 
presence o n the Internet, another would be to engage in more reporting to 
international financial institutions (e.g. BIS).  
In the medium term, OFCs ought to improve the image and reputation of their tax 
systems. Although the OECD project has been marred with difficulties, it has proven 
itself to be resilient. Therefore, OFCs should be proactive: 
•  A first, and rather uncontroversial step, would be to end opaque tax practices (i.e. 
non-public tax measures, e.g. negotiated discretionary tax rates). This would meet 
some of the transparency requirements of the OECD.  
•  A second, and more controversial step, would be to try to find ways to reconcile the 
prerogatives of bank secrecy with the demands of  specific information exchange 
demanded by the OECD. One avenue to explore is ways to define the confidentiality 
standards that such information exchange agreements are subject to (in other words, 
the ways that the information delivered by Liechtenstein would be used).  MATTIAS LEVIN 
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•  OFCs ought to argue strongly for the case of tax sovereignty. It is not only low tax 
countries that feel uncomfortable with the emerging tax regime. High-tax countries 
are not interested in an international regime, which by the logic of negotiation, 
would tend to strike a compromise between low tax regimes and high tax regimes.  
•  The EU is already finding it difficult to convince European OFCs to implement 
similar measures to those adopted by member states. Advances in the OECD 
process is likely to be of limited importance to the EU process, as the EU demands 
automatic information exchange, not specific information as is called for by the 
OECD. The reaction of European OFCs is entirely comprehensible. The only reason 
why the EU is engaged in negotiations is that it was the only way to persuade 
Luxembourg (and to some extent Austria) to agree on information exchange. A 
sensible compromise solution would be that OFCs permanently introduce the same 
system that Luxembourg and Austria will have on an interim basis, i.e. withholding 
taxes of 15-20%, coupled with transferring 75% of the revenue to the member state 
of residence of the investor. That is an offer that the EU would find hard to refuse. 
In the long term, OFCs ought to widen the business base: 
•  The services should not be based entirely on secrecy, tax and regulatory advantages.  
•  OFCs should compete to attract key financial skills and people.  
The international community has to address the legitimacy problem 
The international community is now engaged in a process whose eventual goal is to 
pressure sovereign states or semi-sovereign jurisdictions to make sweeping changes to 
their policies. This poses problems of legitimacy, especially as the international public 
good involved in certain cases rests on fairly uncertain theoretical ground. The 
international community has a  responsibility to ensure that this process is as fair, 
transparent and reliable as possible. In this domain there is a room for improvement.  
On  fairness, the international community should ensure a level playing field. OFCs 
compete for capital in a global financial market. Clamping down only on some will only 
divert that capital elsewhere and lead to a massive exodus of financial capital out of the 
law-abiding OFC. Moreover, the main benefactors will be key OECD members (the UK 
and the US). Applying the law to only a select few does not solve the problem of 
harmful tax practices, financial systemic risk and money laundering. In addition, it is 
unfair to the concerned jurisdictions. They are highly dependent on their financial sector 
and cannot legitimately be asked to take unilateral steps that would eliminate it.  
In order to increase their credibility and defuse accusations of hypocrisy, the EU’s and 
the OECD’s members should eliminate their own harmful tax practices before 
demanding anything similar from  non-members. The large financial centres should 
ensure that they have adequately combated money laundering before bashing OFCs. So 
far, as OFC representatives have accurately pointed out, members have aggressively 
protected their national interests.  
The OECD, the FATF and the FSF should be prepared to provide assistance to those 
OFCs that agree to cooperate.  
On transparency and reliability, it is important that sanctions be defined more clearly. 
This would raise the stakes and increase the domestic “win-set” in the jurisdictions THE PROSPECTS FOR OFCS 
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concerned, as it would be clear what costs would be imposed in the case of non-
compliance. The time for constructive ambiguity is over. Overall, the carrot side of the 
name-and-shame process should be more fully developed and more precisely defined as 
well. As it is now, OFCs face a huge risk to their reputation if they do not comply, yet 
conversely, there is today little reward for compliance (e.g. public praise from an 
international institution). 
In sum, the OECD in particular, with the support of other institutions as well, should 
aim at developing a more systematic assessment approach with clear and well defined 
carrots and sticks and a systematic, fair and reliable way of testing progress.  
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